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TAXING STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS
GREGG D. POLSKY*
BRANTJ. HELLWIG**
Abstract: Congress has granted a tax subsidy to physically injured tort
plaintiffs who enter into structured settlements. The subsidy allows these
plaintiffs to exempt the investment yield imbedded within the structured
settlement from federal income taxation. The apparent purpose of the
subsidy is to encourage physically injured plaintiffs to invest, rather than
presently consume, their litigation recoveries. Although the statutory sub-
sidy by its terms is available only to physically injured tort plaintiffs, a
growing structured settlement industry now contends that the same tax
benefit of yield exemption is available to plaintiffs' lawyers and non-
physically injured tort plaintiffs under general, common-law tax princi-
ples. If the structured settlement industry is correct, then all tort plaintiffs
and their lawyers may invest their litigation proceeds in a tax-free manner
simply by using structured payment arrangements. Structured arrange-
ments, therefore, would be far superior to traditional tax-favored retire-
ment accounts (e.g., 401 (k)s, IRAs), which provide the same tax benefit
of yield exemption but are subject to significant constraints. Accordingly,
if proponents of structured arrangements are correct in their interpreta-
tion of the tax law, these arrangements can be described as "super-IRAs"
because they provide full yield exemption without any corresponding
limitations or restrictions. This Article examines the taxation of struc-
tured payment arrangements, ultimately concluding that the structured
settlement industry's positions are unpersuasive. Nevertheless, because of
the muddled state of the tax law on the issue, this Article recommends
legislative and administrative action to close the yield-exemption loop-
hole with respect to its unintended beneficiaries.
INTRODUCTION
A personal injury plaintiff traditionally receives compensation
through a lump-sum payment from the defendant or its insurer. This
lump sum could be paid pursuant to a judgment rendered by a court
@ 2010 Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig. The authors thank Joseph Dodge and
Adam Hirsch for providing useful comments on an earlier draft and Adam Scales for sup-
plying background information regarding the structured settlement industry.
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or, more commonly, pursuant to a settlement agreement. Occasionally,
instead of calling for a lump sum payment, a settlement agreement will
provide for periodic payments to be made to the plaintiff over a stated
term. These periodic payment arrangements are known as structured
settlements.
From the plaintiff's perspective, a structured settlement is akin to
the investment of the litigation recovery in an annuity: As with tradi-
tional annuities, there exists considerable flexibility in designing the
terms of the payment schedule of a structured settlement.' Typically,
these settlements call for the plaintiff to receive level or increasing cash
payments at regular intervals (e.g., monthly) for a fixed term.
Congress has granted a tax subsidy to physically injured tort plain-
tiffs who enter into structured settlements.2 The subsidy allows these
plaintiffs to exempt the investment yield imbedded within the deferred
payment arrangement from federal income taxation. The apparent
purpose of the subsidy is to encourage physically injured plaintiffs to
invest, rather than presently consume, their litigation recoveries.
Although the statutory subsidy by its terms is available only to
physically injured tort plaintiffs, the structured settlement industry now
contends that the same tax benefit of yield exemption is available to
plaintiffs' lawyers and non-physically injured tort plaintiffs under gen-
eral, common-law tax principles. If the structured settlement industry is
correct, then all tort plaintiffs and their lawyers may invest their litiga-
tion proceeds in a tax-free manner simply by using structured payment
arrangements (which we refpr to collectively as "structured settle-
ments.")3 Structured settlements, therefore, would be far superior to
traditional qualified retirement accounts (e.g., 401 (k)s, IRAs) that pro-
vide the same tax benefit of yield exemption but are subject to signifi-
cant constraints. 4 Accordingly, if proponents of structured settlements
I See Lawrence A. Frolik, The Convegence ofLR.C. § 104(a)(2), Norfolk & Western Rail-
way Co. v. Liepelt and Structured Tort Settlements: Tax Policy "Derailed," 51 FORDHAM L. REV.
565, 573 (1983) (describing the numerous forms that structured settlement may take).
2 As discussed below, in a structured settlement the plaintiff receives damages through
periodic payments rather than in a lump sum.
3 This Article uses the term "structured settlement" to include structured attorney fee
arrangements even though the fee arrangements do not involve "settlements" of claims.
(Instead these arrangements compensate the attorney for the legal services provided to
the plaintiff.) This is done simply for ease of exposition. When referring only to structured
attorney fee arrangements, this Article will use the term "structured fee arrangements."
4 The amount of money that may be invested in qualified plans each year is limited to
$5000 in the case of IRAs and roughly $15,000 in the case of employer-provided retirement
accounts, and qualified-plan participants face a significant penalty if they withdraw amounts
before retirement age. Sec I.R.C. § 219(b) (2006) (limiting the amount that may be invested
[Vol. 51:3940
2010] Taxing Stru ctured Settlements 41
are correct in their interpretation of the tax law, these arrangements
can be described as "super-IRAs," because they provide full yield ex-
emption without any corresponding limitations or restrictions.
This Article examines the taxation of structured settlements. Part I
describes a typical structured settlement and explains the tax benefits
that these arrangements are designed to provide.5 Part I reviews the
general background principles of income realization that apply to struc-
tured settlements.6 Part III then explains how Congress has statutorily
modified these principles with respect to structured settlements of
physical injury claims.7 Parts IV and V address and ultimately reject the
argument that the tax benefits of structured settlements are also avail-
able to non-physically injured plaintiffs or to trial lawyers.8 Part VI ad-
dresses a potential loose end, explaining that the tax benefits of struc-
tured settlements would not be offset by the imposition of substitute
taxation on other parties to the arrangement.9 The Article concludes
with specific recommendations for action by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice ("IRS"), the Treasury Department, and Congress.
I. THE MECHANICS AND POTENTIAL TAX BENEFITS OF
STRUCTURED SETILEMENTS
A. The Prototypical Structured Settlement
In a structured settlement, the settlement agreement between the
plaintiff and the defendant (or its insurer) calls for the defendant (in-
surer) to make future specified payments to the plaintiff in exchange
for the release of the plaintiff's claim. In virtually all structured settle-
ments, the defendant (insurer) will immediately assign its obligation to
make the specified future payments to a structured settlement com-
pany ("SSC"). In exchange for accepting the payment obligation, the
SSC receives from the defendant (insurer) a lump sum payment equal
to the present value of the future payments owed to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff, in turn, agrees to look only to the SSC for the future pay-
in an IRA to $5000); I.R.C. § 72(t) (assessing 10% penalty for early withdrawal from a "quali-
fied retirement plan"). By comparison, there is no limit on amounts that may be invested in
structured settlements, and participants in these arrangements have complete flexibility in
setting the payment dates.
5 See infra notes 10-40 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 41-100 and accompanying text.
7 Sce infra notes 101-152 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 153-234 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 235-262 and accompanying text.
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ments.10 The SSC then uses the lump sum payment that it receives
from the defendant (insurer) to purchase an annuity from a life insur-
ance company. This annuity is called the funding asset, and it provides
the SSC with the necessary liquidity to satisfy its payment obligations to
the plaintiff. Often, the SSC simply directs the annuity issuer to pay the
annuity benefits directly to the plaintiff. In almost all cases, the SSC
used in a structured settlement is an affiliate of the life insurance com-
pany that issues the annuity that serves as the funding asset.
A typical structured settlement of a claim covered by the defen-
dant's liability insurance policy is depicted below:
4. Periodic Paymnents(Pursuant to instructions from sci
S. Lup sum S. Purchase of
e.a payment annuir
cf ~e2. .eiease of '.
liability
1. Agreement Iiation)
to \nial;
Periodic paymentzz 2. LUMP SUM:
payment
eean Defenda's2. ssumption oi
Liability Insurer payment obligaiorn
Assignments to SSCs are not absolutely necessary to implement a
structured settlement. The defendant (insurer) could remain obligated to
make the future payments to the plaintiff. Nevertheless, assignments are
pervasive in the structured settlement industry because they allow the
defendants (insurers) to "close their books" with respect to the litiga-
tion." In addition, assignments provide flexibility by allowing the plaintiff
to choose the party that will be obligated to make the future payments.
10 In technical terms, the plaintiff grants the defendant (insurer) a novation with re-
spect to its obligation to make future payments to the plaintiff. A novation is "the act of
substituting for an old obligation a new one that either replaces an existing obligation with
a new obligation or replaces an original party with a new party." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1168 (9th ed. 2009).
11 By paying the SSC to assume the obligation to make periodic payments, self-insured
defendants also obtain a tax advantage by not having to pay tax on the investment yield
42 [Vol. 51:39
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Trial lawyers sometimes structure their contingency fees using an
identical arrangement.' 2 Fees are most commonly structured in cases
where plaintiffs have agreed to structure their own recoveries. For in-
stance, in a case where the attorney is entitled to a one-third contin-
gency fee, an attorney might accept a structured fee arrangement that
entitles him to receive periodic payments on the same schedule as the
plaintiff. Thus, if the plaintiff is entitled to ten annual payments of
$20,000, the attorney would receive ten annual payments of $10,000.
The mechanics of structured settlements highlight an important
issue: if the defendant (insurer) is willing to make a lump sum payment
to an SSC and if the plaintiff (or attorney) wishes to invest the lump
sum in an annuity, then why doesn't the plaintiff (attorney) simply re-
ceive a lump sum payment and then purchase an annuity? In other
words, why involve the middleman, the SSC? The answer is that the
plaintiff (attorney) seeks the tax benefit described below. 13
B. Comparative Taxation ofLump Sum Payments and Structures
1. General Tax Rules Governing Lump Sum Payments
To determine the tax advantage of these arrangements, the tax
consequences of structured settlements must be compared with the tax
consequences of the plaintiff's (attorney's) receipt of a lump sum that
is then invested in an annuity. Leaving aside differences in their tax
treatment, these transactions are economically equivalent. Accordingly,
to assess the tax benefit of structured settlements, it is necessary first to
understand the tax rules governing lump sum payments of personal
injury damages and attorney's fees, as well as the tax rules that apply to
investments in annuities.
that is earned to finance the future payments. Cf infra note 35 (describing how employer
in nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements pays tax on the investment yield
generated within these arrangements).
12 Thus, the attorney and the defendant (insurer) first enter into an agreement calling
for the defendant (insurer) to make future payments to the attorney. The defendant (in-
surer) then assigns this liability to an SSC, which receives a lump sum as compensation,
and the attorney releases the defendant (insurer) from its future payment obligations. The
SSC in turn uses the lump sum to purchase an annuity to fund the future payments due to
the attorney.
1 Additionally, a structured settlement may provide the recipient with creditor protec-
tions that would not be available if the plaintiff simply used a lump-sum recovery to pur-
chase an annuity in the plaintiffs individual name. Sec Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts
and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Pcrspectives, 73 wASH. U. L.Q. 1, 5 n.14 (1995) (dis-
cussing the potential creditor protection benefits of structured settlements).
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a. Consequences to the Plaintiff
If a plaintiffs cause of action arises out of a physical injury, then a
lump sum recovery of damages is exempt from taxation under I.R.C.
§ 104(a) (2).14 On the other hand, if the plaintiff s cause of action arises
out of a non-physical injury, then a lump sum recovery is taxable. Thus,
for example, lump sum settlements of employment discrimination claims
are taxable; settlements of automobile accident claims are not.
Personal injury plaintiffs typically hire their attorneys on a contin-
gency fee basis. Under a standard arrangement, the plaintiff agrees to
pay the attorney a stated percentage (e.g., one-third) of the gross re-
covery. As confirmed in 2006 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Commis-
sioner v. Banks'5 a plaintiff who compensates an attorney on a contin-
gency basis is treated for tax purposes as receiving the entire recovery
(including the attorney fee portion) and then paying the contingent
fee to the attorney, even if the plaintiff never formally receives the at-
torney fee portion of the recovery. A physical injury plaintiff cannot
deduct a contingent fee payment because it relates to the production
or collection of tax-exempt income (i.e., the tax-free recovery).' 6 In
contrast, a non-physical injury plaintiff may deduct a contingent fee
because it is an expense incurred to generate a taxable recovery.'7 The
end result is that a physical injury plaintiffs net recovery is tax-free,
while a non-physical injury plaintiffs net recovery is taxable.' 8
b. Consequences to the Plaintiffs ,,ttorney
Although a plaintiffs tax consequences depend on whether the
claim arises out of a physical injury, an attorney's tax consequences do
not depend on the underlying nature of the claim. The attorney's fee is
subject to income tax in the year it is received.' 9
14 Punitive damages, however, are taxable even if the underlying cause of action relates
to a physical injury. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) (2006).
15 543 U.S. 426, 433-37 (2005).16 I.R.C. § 265(a) (1).
17 If the non-physical injury litigation is related to the plaintiffs trade or business, then
the deduction is authorized by I.R.C. § 162(a). In all other cases, the deduction would be
authorized by I.R.C. § 212(1).
18 The tax consequences to the non-physical injury plaintiff may in fact be more oner-
ous than this. Due to the restrictions on miscellaneous itemized deductions, a non-physical
injury plaintiff effectively may be subject to tax on an amount greater than the net recov-
ery. This possibility is discussed infra notes 218-228 and accompanying text.
19 Fee income earned by successful trial lawyers is subject to federal income and em-
ployment taxes at a marginal rate of 37.4%. In the case of an attorney that earns more
than $372,950 of taxable income (in 2009), the marginal income tax rate is 35%. See IRC
44 [Vol. 51:39
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c. After-Tax Investment in Annuity
If the plaintiff (attorney) were to invest the lump sum payment in
an annuity, the tax treatment of the payments received under the annu-
ity would be governed by I.R.C. § 72.20 I.R.C. § 72 prescribes the method
for allocating annuity payments between the portion representing the
tax-free return of principal and the portion representing the taxable
investment yield.21 This allocation is determined by the exclusion ratio,
defined generally as the ratio that the taxpayer's investment in the an-
nuity bears to the total undiscounted amount of payments expected to
be received under the contract.22 For example, assume that a taxpayer
pays $1000 to receive two annual payments of $553, with the first pay-
ment to be received in one year. The exclusion ratio is $1000/$1106 or
90.42%. Accordingly, 90.42% ($500) of each $553 payment will be con-
sidered a tax-free recovery of the initial $1000 payment, with the re-
maining 9.58% ($53) constituting the taxpayer's investment yield, which
is taxed as ordinary income.
2. Quantifying the Potential Tax Benefit of Structures
As will be discussed in Part II, the tax treatment of structured set-
tlements turns on whether the SSC's obligation to make fitture cash
payments (the "SSC obligation") is treated, for the purpose of applying
the cash method of accounting, as an item of "property."23 If so, the
§ 1(c); Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107 (adjusting for inflation). This figure is the
same whether the attorney is single or married filing a joint return. Sce I.R.C. § 1(a), (c).
The attorney must also pay federal employment tax on the fee. The marginal employment
tax rate on attorneys who are in the 35% tax bracket is 2.4%. Sec id. § 1401(b) (imposing
the Medicare component of the self-employment tax at a rate equal to 2.9% of the indi-
vidual's self-employment income). As one-half of this tax is deductible above-the-line, the
effective employment tax rate to a taxpayer in the 35% marginal income tax bracket is
2.3925%. See id. §§ 62(a)(1), 164(f). The Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
component of the self-employment tax (nominally 12.40%) is not levied on earnings from
self-employment in excess of $106,800 (2009 ceiling). See id. § 1401 (a) (imposing OASDI
component of self-employment tax); id. § 1402(b) (supplying cap); see also News Release,
Soc. Sec. Admin., Soc. Sec. Announces 5.8 Percent Benefit Increase for 2009, Oct. 16,
2008, http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/pr/2009cola-pr.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2009) (an-
nouncing 2009 cost-of-living adjustments).
20 See I.R.C. § 72. I.R.C. § 72 would apply to the annuity regardless of whether the lump
sum was excluded under § 104(a) (2) as damages received for personal physical injuries.
21 See id. § 72(b), (c).
22 Id.
23 See infra notes 43-100 and accompanying text.
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present value of the SSC obligation 24 will be taken into account for tax
purposes at the time the SSC obligation is created. Accordingly, at that
time, the present value of the obligation will be either (a) excluded
from gross income under I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) if the settlement relates to
a physical injury, or (b) included in gross income.25 In either event, the
subsequent investment yield earned on the present value of the SSC
obligation will be taxed under the annuity rules of I.R.C. § 72.26 Alter-
natively, if the SSC obligation is not regarded as an item of property for
cash method purposes, then the creation of the obligation is a non-
event. In that case, the cash payments later made by the SSC will be
treated as the litigation recovery or the attorney's fee, as the case may
be. Under this view, if I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) applies, then the cash pay-
ments would be excluded from gross income in their entirety; in all
other cases, the cash payments would be taxed upon receipt.27
a. Consequences to Parties Who Receive Structured Payments
Recall that in cases involving a physical injury, a lump sum pay-
ment to the plaintiff would be received tax-free; any investment yield
thereon, however, would be taxable.28 If the SSC obligation is regarded
as an item of property for cash method purposes, then the present
value of the SSC obligation would constitute the tax-free recovery and
the subsequent cash payments received pursuant to the obligation
would be taxed under the annuity rules in I.R.C. § 72. On the other
hand, if the SSC obligation is not treated as an item of property (aind
therefore is disregarded under the cash method), then the later cash
payments will be treated as the physical injury recovery that is allowed
to be received tax-free-even though a portion of each payment repre-
sents investment yield. Thits, if the SSC obligation is not treated as an
item of property, the plaintiff would be allowed to earn a tax-free yield
on the recovery.
2 The present value of the SSC obligation will equal the purchase price of the funding
asset, which will equal the amount paid by the defendant (insurer) to induce the SSC to
assume the defendant's obligation to make periodic payments. The purchase price of the
funding asset may be slightly less than the amount paid to the SSC due to a de minimis
administrative fee paid by the defendant (insurer) that is included in the amount paid to
the SSC. See infra note 256. We ignore this administrative fee for the sake of simplicity.
2 Sec I.R.C. § 104(a) (2).
26 See id. § 72(b), (c).
2 Sec id. § 104(a) (2).
2 See Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59; Rev. Rul. 76-133, 1976-1 C.B. 34 (each confirming
the taxation of investment income generated from the investment of excluded lump-sum
recoveries).
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The same yield-exemption effect would be present in non-physical
injury structured settlements (and in structured attorney-fee arrange-
ments), if the SSC obligation is not treated as an item of property. Dis-
regarding the receipt of the SSC obligation in these cases results in de-
ferral of taxation from the time that the obligation is created until the
time that cash payments are received pursuant to the obligation. Under
the so-called Cary Brown model, deferring tax on a given amount of
gross income is economically equivalent to taxing the amount currently
and then exempting the investment return on the resulting after-tax
amount during the period of deferral.29 Simply put, deferral is "equiva-
lent to exemption of investment income."30
This yield-exemption effect can be shown mathematically. Assume
p represents a given amount of income, + the annual rate of investment
return, t the tax rate, and n the period of deferral. Deferring the tax on
p for n years would leave the taxpayer with the following amount after
the imposition of tax in year n: [p(1-)"](1-t). On the other hand, im-
mediately subjecting p to taxation but then allowing the after-tax
amount to grow tax free would produce the following after-tax amount:
[p(1-t)](1-)". Algebraically, these two formulas are identical.31 The
2 This effect is dependent on certain assumptions, the most important of which in
this context is that the taxpayer's marginal tax rate is the same at the beginning and the
end of the period of deferral. For discussion of the assumptions, see CHRIs H. HANNA,
COMPARATIVE INCOME TAx DEFERRAL: THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 11-12 (2000).
so Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguisc: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 YALE L.J.
506, 519 (1986).
3 This algebra explains why, under the assumptions of the Cary Brown model, tradi-
tional IRAs and Roth IRAs provide equivalent tax benefits despite their different mechan-
ics. To illustrate, assume that a taxpayer wishes to invest $5000 of pre-tax salary until re-
tirement in ten years, at which time the taxpayer will withdraw the entire amount plus its
investment return. Assume further that the taxpayer will always be subject to a 40% mar-
ginal tax rate and that the taxpayer's pre-tax rate of investment return is 10%. The tax-
payer, using a traditional IRA, will receive an immediate deduction of $5000, which will
absorb the associated $5000 of salary income. Thus, the taxpayer will not pay immediate
tax on the $5000 of salary; instead, this tax will be deferred until a withdrawal is made
from the IRA in ten years. This deferral is analogous to the deferral that results in struc-
tured settlements of non-physical injury claims if the SSC obligation is disregarded.
In the traditional IRA, the $5000 will grow at a 10% rate. Accordingly, in ten years the
amount in the IRA will grow to $12,969. When this amount is withdrawn, the taxpayer will owe
tax of 40% of that amount, or $5188. Thus, the taxpayer will end up with $7782 ($12,969-
$5188).
If the taxpayer instead uses a Roth IRA, the taxpayer will get no deduction for making
the contribution to the account. Accordingly, the account will be funded with only $3000, the
amount of the $5000 salary that is left after taxes. The $3000 amount will grow inside the
Roth IRA at a 10% rate to $7782, and the taxpayer can withdraw this amount tax-free. The
taxpayer will therefore end up with the same amount ($7782) using either the traditional or
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yield-exemption effect is illustrated further in the Appendix through
specific numerical examples that show the tax benefit of structured set-
tlements if the SSC obligation is not treated as an item of property.32
b. Consequences to Other Parties
The discussion thus far has demonstrated that not treating an SSC
obligation as an item of property is tantamount to exempting the
payee's investment yield from taxation.33 This analysis implicitly as-
sumed that a tax burden was not imposed on some other party to the
structure that would offset this benefit. If such a burden were in fact im-
posed, the burden would have to be compared to the tax benefit re-
ceived by the payee (i.e., the plaintiff or the attorney)34 to determine
whether structured settlements produce an overall net tax benefit. In
other words, to evaluate whether a structured settlement is tax-advan-
taged, the tax consequences to all parties to the transaction must be
considered. If a tax benefit is granted to one party (e.g., the plaintiff),
but a perfectly offsetting tax burden is imposed on another other party
(e.g., the defendant), the transaction as a whole is not tax-advantaged.
In that case, the parties would simply adjust prices to reflect their re-
spective tax consequences, leaving them in the same economic position
that they would have occupied absent these tax consequences. 5
the Roth IRA. The traditional IRA provides deferral while the Roth IRA provides yield ex-
emption; nevertheless, their results (under the Cary Brown assumptions) are the same.
32 Scc infra app. at 92-94.
3 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
34 Although the payee receives the nominal tax benefit of yield exemption, the benefit
could be shared with the other parties to the structure. For example, the settlement cost to
the defendant could be lower than it otherwise would be if the tax benefit was not avail-
able to the plaintiff. Sce infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
3 To illustrate, consider the taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation. If cer-
tain requirements are satisfied, the employee defers taxation of an employer's promise to
pay until receipt of payment in cash, and the employer's deduction for compensation is
deferred until the same time. In addition, the employer pays tax on any investment yield
that is generated by the assets that will fund the payment of deferred compensation be-
tween the time that the deferred compensation is earned by the employee and the time
that it is actually paid out. The employee receives the benefit of tax deferral. Per the Cary
Brown model, the investment yield earned by the employee on the deferred compensation
during the period of deferral is effectively exempt from tax. Instead, this tax is incurred by
the employer. The extra tax burden on the employer will be taken into account by the
employer in negotiating the terms of the deferred compensation arrangement. For exam-
ple, the employer could set the yield that it is willing to pay on the deferred compensation
by reference to its after-tax rate of return. In such a case, if the employer and the employee
are subject to the same marginal tax rate, the deferred compensation arrangement will not
be tax advantaged because the benefit obtained by the employee (yield exemption) is per-
fectly offset by the burden imposed on the employer (tax liability on what is really the em-
48 [Vol. 51:39
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The possibility of substitute taxation in the context of structured
settlements, therefore, must be considered, and Part VI does so by ana-
lyzing the tax consequences of structured settlements to parties other
than the payee. 36 In particular, it examines whether the yield exemp-
tion afforded the payee is offset or mitigated by a proxy tax on the de-
fendant, its insurance carrier, or the SSC. If such a proxy tax were im-
posed, the adversely affected party would be expected to adjust its
pricing. This adjustment would drive down the yield that the plaintiff
(attorney) earns within the structure, perhaps to the point that the
plaintiff (attorney) would be in no better position than if the plaintiff
(attorney) received a lump sum and then invested it directly. The
analysis in Part VI ultimately concludes that none of the other parties to
a typical structure likely incurs a substitute tax that would mitigate the
yield-exemption benefit received by plaintiffs (attorneys) if the SSC ob-
ligation is not treated as an item of property.37 Thus, structured settle-
ments will be tax-advantaged unless SSC obligations are treated as prop-
erty under the cash method.
c. Shifting of the Tax Benefit
The analysis thus far has implied that the potential tax advantage
of structured settlements would be captured entirely by the payee (i.e.,
the plaintiff or the attorney). Although the yield-exemption benefit is
nominally afforded to the payee, other parties to structured settlements
could capture all or a portion of the benefit through bargaining.38 For
example, defendants or their insurers could capture some of the bene-
fit in the form of lower settlement costs. 39 Alternatively, annuity issuers
could capture a portion of the benefit by paying lower yields. For the
purposes of this Article, it is immaterial how the benefit is in fact shared
ployee's yield). See Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of Deferred Compen-
sation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 571, 593-94 (2007). In the case of equivalent marginal tax rates, the
substitute taxation imposed on the employer precludes the deferred compensation ar-
rangement from producing a net tax benefit to the parties, or stated differently, a net tax
detriment to the public fisc.
36 See infra notes 235-262 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 235-262 and accompanying text.
38 See, e.g., Adam F. Scales, Against Settlement Factoting? The Mlarket in Tort Claims Has Ar-
fived, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 859, 884 (stating that "there is no real dispute that structured set-
tlements save defendants money").
'9 STAFF OF JOINT COMNI. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., TAX TREATMENT OF STRUCTURED
SETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS 5 (1999), available at http://www.jct.gov/jct-html/x-15-99.htm
(suggesting that structured settlements are not more frequently employed in personal physi-
cal injury cases because defendants attempt to capture the benefit of the tax subsidy by mak-
ing lower structured settlement offers).
2010] 49
Boston College Law Review
among the parties. 40 We are content with showing that a tax benefit
exists if the SSC obligation is not regarded as an item of property and
with describing the nature of such benefit (i.e., the equivalent of yield
exemption). For simplicity sake, this Article assumes that no shifting of
the tax benefit occurs and, accordingly, that the entire benefit of yield
exemption would be captured by the payee.
II. GENERAL TAX TREATMENT OF CONTRACTUAL PAYMENT RIGHTS
As explained above, structured settlements will be tax-advantaged
if the SSC obligation is not treated as an item of property under the
cash method of accounting.41 We now turn to this doctrinal issue.
An SSC obligation represents nothing more than an unsecured
contractual right to receive future payments of cash. This Part examines
the general cash method principles that determine whether a contrac-
tual right to future cash payments is treated as an item of property42
These principles provide the background necessary to understand the
effect of specific Code provisions on structured settlements of physical
injury claims.
A. Cash Method Principles
Individuals generally use the cash method of accounting in com-
pitting their taxable income.43 Under the cash method, a taxpayer must
include in gross income all items of cash, property, or services that are
received during the taxable year." This seemingly simple rule masks a
complex issue that lies at the heart of the cash method: to what extent
does a contractual payment right-such as a trade account receivable-
constitute an item of "property," the receipt or creation of which gives
rise to immediate income recognition under the cash method? On one
hand, accounts receivable and similar contractual payment rights con-
40 This statement, however, is not intended to suggest that the potential for economic
shifting is unimportant. If policymakers intend to influence the behavior of one party to a
transaction through the provision of a tax benefit, the possibility that the tax benefit might
be captured by others must be considered in evaluating the likely effectiveness of the tax
provision in achieving its intended goals.
41 Sec supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 43-100 and accompanying text.
4 Sc BORIS 1. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFTS 1 105.3.1, at 105-48 (2d ed. 1989) (noting that the cash method is widely used
among wage earners, employees, and professionals).
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 2006). If a specific exclusion from
gross income applies to an item, however, then the item would not be included in gross
income. See I.R.C. § 102(a) (2006) (excluding gifts from gross income).
[Vol. 51:3950
Taxing Structured Settlements
stitute property under state law, and the term "property" has been
broadly construed under federal tax law to include both tangible and
intangible property, regardless of whether the property is liquid or oth-
erwise capable of ready valuation. 45 On the other hand, if the term in-
cluded all contractual payment rights, the cash method of accounting
would be functionally eliminated. For example, such an expansive in-
terpretation would mean that a garden variety account receivable
would be taxed to the extent of its fair market value when it is created,
a result that is fundamentally inconsistent with cash method principles.
Taxing an account receivable at the time it is created, as opposed to the
time it is paid, is the prototypical result under the accrual method of
accounting.46 Therefore, treating all contractual payment rights as
property would effectively merge the cash method into the accrual
method.47
To defend the separate province of the cash method, courts have
long held that the creation of a contractual payment right generally
does not give rise to immediate taxation under the cash method. For
example, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana in
the 1920 case of United States v. Chfistine Oil 6f Gas Co. explained that
"where the effect of a transaction is a mere promise to pay, and not an
actual payment, it cannot be said to be income, until it has been actu-
ally received, and is not subject to be taxed as such until its actual re-
ceipt."48 Similarly, the Board of Tax Appeals in the 1928 case of Zittel v.
Commissioner asserted that "[t]axpayers on a [cash] receipts and dis-
bursements basis are required to report only income actually received
no matter how binding any contracts they may have to receive more."49
1 For instance, a non-controlling equity interest in a closely-held business constitutes
property. Although determining the fair market value of such an interest is an imprecise
undertaking, a cottage industry has arisen to value such interests, typically for estate and
gift tax purposes.
46 See BIrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 43, 105.3.2, at 105-49 ("The basic difference
between cash and accrual accounting is that the latter requires accounts receivable and
similar claims to be reported when they arise from a credit transaction.").
4 See id. ("The basic difference between cash and accrual accounting ... would be ob-
literated if cash basis taxpayers were required to treat all claims against employers, clients.
and customers as 'property' to be valued and taken into income when the services are
rendered, rather than when claims are paid."); WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXA-
TION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 5.02[1], at 5-7 n.22 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that
the possibility that a definition of property that includes all contractual payments rights
would "swallow[] the cash method of accounting").
4 269 F. 458, 459-60 (W.D. La. 1920).
4 12 B.T.A. 675, 677 (1928).
2010]1
Boston College Law Review
The cash method is an imprecise and somewhat crude method of
accounting. By ignoring the receipt of valuable contractual rights, the
cash method results in inaccurate measurement of economic income.50
The imprecision of the cash method is justified, however, on grounds of
administrability. The cash method spares standard, everyday commer-
cial transactions-i.e., the provision of services for a future paycheck or
the creation of an account receivable upon the performance of ser-
vices-from the practical difficulties of taxing contractual payment
rights as they are earned. An accrual accounting regime would require
taxpayers to determine precisely when a contractual payment right is
earned and the value of the right at that time.51 It also would require
error correction mechanisms if these valuations prove to be too high or
low. Furthermore, taxpayers would incur potential liquidity burdens
because taxes would be due on contractual payment rights before they
received any cash. In short, under the cash method, precision in in-
come measurement yields to simplicity in taxing everyday commerce. 52
B. The Coinmon Law Economic Benefit Doctfine
Despite the general rule that contractual payment rights are not
treated as property under the, cash method, there exists a significant
exception. Contractual paymei-t rights that are deemed to provide an
"economic benefit" to the taxpayer are treated as property. This termi-
nology is confusing, as the receipt of any contractual payment right
with a fair market value greater than zero provides an economic benefit
because the recipient's economic position is improved. Nevertheless,
courts have used the phrase "economic benefit" as a term of art to dis-
tinguish garden-variety contractual payment rights (e.g., accounts re-
ceivable) that are not treated as property tinder the cash method from
the more unusual contractual payment rights that are treated as prop-
erty.6
1. Purchased Promises to Pay from Third Parties
The origins of the economic benefit doctrine lie in the 1942 Tax
Court case Brodie v. Conmissione;54 which addressed a bonus program
5o See Halperin, supra note 30, at 510.
s1 See BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 43, 1 105.3.2, at 105-49.
2 Sec id. 1 105.3.1, at 105-48 (describing the simplicity of the cash method and its at-
tractiveness to laypersons).
5s See, e.g., United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1950).
54 1 T.C. 275, 276-77 (1942).
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established by a company for the benefit of its executives. For the tax
years at issue, the company unilaterally decided to pay a portion of the
executives' bonuses by issuing to them single-premium retirement an-
nuities.55 Under the terms of the annuities, no payments would be
made until the executive's seventieth birthday, the executive could not
assign his payment rights under the contract, and the executive could
not surrender the annuity to the insurance company for any value.56
The IRS determined that the executives recognized gross income upon
receiving the annuity, with the amount of gross income equaling the
premium the company had paid for each policy.5 7 Arguing that their
inability to assign or surrender the policies precluded current taxation,
the executives claimed that the mere receipt of the annuity contract,
which was nothing more than the insurer's contractual payment obliga-
tion, was not a taxable event.58 The Tax Court sided with the IRS, hold-
ing that the issuance of the contractual payment obligation resulted in
immediate taxation.59
Shortly after the Tax Court's decision in Brodie, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the same issue in United States
v. Drescher:60 The taxpayer in Drescher was an executive of a company
that had purchased $5,000 single-premium annuity contracts for its ex-
ecutives as part of a deferred compensation plan.6 ' The contract ir-
revocably designated the executive as the annuitant, and the executive
possessed the right to name a beneficiary to receive the payment rights
upon his death. 62 The taxpayer, however, could not surrender the an-
nuity for its cash value or assign his rights to future annuity payments
during his lifetime.63 In light of these restrictions, the taxpayer claimed
that the mere purchase of the annuity by his employer did not give rise
to gross income.64 He argued instead that he should include amounts
in gross income only as the cash payments under the annuity were re-
ceived. 65 The Second Circuit disagreed, concluding that the employer's
purchase of the annuity conferred upon the taxpayer a presently tax-
55 Id. at 277.
56 Id. at 278-79.
5 Id. at 282-84.
58 Id. at 282.
5 Id. at 282-84.
6o Dreschei; 179 F.2d at 864.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See id. at 864-65.
65 Id. at 865.
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able benefit: "It cannot be doubted that ... the plaintiff received as
compensation for prior services something of economic benefit which he
had not previously had, namely, the obligation of the insurance com-
pany to pay money in the future to him or his designated beneficiaries
.. "66 Accordingly, the court determined that the insurance com-
pany's obligation to the executive was immediately taxable to him.6 7
The Brodie and Drescher decisions stand for the proposition that the
receipt of a contractual payment obligation issued by a third party to a
transaction gives rise to current taxation under the cash method. Using
the cash method's terminology,68 a third-party promise is treated as an
item of "property" that is taxable upon receipt, notwithstanding the
general rule that contractual payment obligations ordinarily are not
treated as property.69
2. Funded Second-Party Promises to Pay
The economic benefit doctrine is not limited to the third-party
promise context. A series of cases and revenue rulings have established
that a contractual payment obligation issued by a second party to the
transaction would be immediately taxable if the payment obligation is
"funded." A payment obligation is funded if money is set aside in an
escrow or trust arrangement to secure the recipient's rights to future
payments. In instances where an obligation is fuinded, the recipient
could receive full payment even if the obligor were to become insolvent
between the time that the payment obligation is created and the time
that cash payments are scheduled to be made.
For example, in the 1946 Tax Court case of McEwen v. Commis-
sione; the employer promised to pay an executive a specified percent-
66 Drschc,; 179 F.2d at 865 (emphasis added). The court devoted the balance of its opin-
ion to determining the proper valuation of the income the taxpayer recognized from the
arrangement, rejecting the taxpayer's argument that the prohibition on assignment ren-
dered the annuity valueless. Id. The Second Circuit conceded, however, that the amount of
income inclusion could be less than the amount of the premium that the company paid for
the annuity: "It may not have been worth to him the amount his employer paid for it; but it
cannot be doubted that there is a figure, greater than zero although less than the premium
cost, which it would have cost him to acquire identical rights." Id. at 865-66.
67 See id. at 865-66.
68 Recall that, under the cash method, a taxpayer realizes income upon the receipt of
cash, property, or services. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
69 In that case, the fair market value of the annuity taxed upon receipt would consti-
tute the "investment in the contract" under I.R.C. § 72, and the excess of the aggregate
annuity payments over this amount would constitute the investment yield subject to taxa-
tion. See supin notes 20-22 and accompanying text (describing annuity taxation).
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age of its profits. 70 Pursuant to this arrangement, the employer annu-
ally transferred the requisite profit-sharing amounts to a trust created
for the executive's benefit.71 The funding of the trust by the employer
was irrevocable; that is, the trust agreement provided that no part of
the trust estate could revert to the employer under any circumstance.72
As a result, the trust assets would not be subject to the claims of the
employer's creditors in the event of the employer's insolvency.
In determining whether the executive was taxed as the employer
transferred amounts to the trust or instead only as cash payments were
later paid from the trust, the Tax Court framed the issue as follows:
"[W]as 'any economic or financial benefit conferred on the [executive]
as compensation' in the taxable year [in which the trust was finded]?"7 3
The Tax Court answered this question in the affirmative and, accord-
ingly, determined that the taxpayer recognized income at the time of
funding.74 In doing so, the court placed considerable emphasis on the
fact that the trust estate could not revert to the employer under any cir-
cumstance.75 The McEwen decision therefore established the proposi-
tion that a second-party promise gives rise to current income inclusion
under the cash method if the promise is irrevocably finded.
The Tax Court's decision in McEwen laid the foundation for its
later decision in Sproull v. Coimissione;76 the case most commonly asso-
ciated with the economic benefit doctrine. The employer in Sproull
transferred $10,500 to a trust for the benefit of its employee in 1945.77
The terms of the trust provided that half of the assets would be distrib-
itted to the employee in 1946, with the remaining half distributed in
1947.78 In determining the proper year of income inclusion-either
when the trust was ftunded or when the employee received distributions
from the trust-the court again examined whether any "economic
benefit" had been conferred upon the employee in the year of fuind-
ing.79 Determining that the formation of the trust provided the execu-
70 6 T.C. 1018, 1019 (1946).
71 The trust agreement provided that the trustee would use the trust assets to purchase
government bonds or single-premium annuities that called for payments to the employee
beginning at age sixty. Id. at 1021-22.
72 Id. at 1023.
7s Id. at 1026 (quoting Smith v. Comm'r, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945)).
7 Scc id.
7 See id.
76 16 T.C. 244, 247-48 (1951), affd 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952).
7 Id. at 245.
78 Id.
9 See id. at 247.
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tive with the requisite economic benefit, the court held that the execu-
tive realized gross income at that point.8 0
Following McEwen, Sproull, and other similar cases, the IRS com-
prehensively laid out its approach to the taxation of contractual pay-
ment obligations through a series of examples in Revenue Ruling 60-
31.81 In the first two examples, an employer merely promised to pay an
employee an amount in the future.82 In these cases, the IRS concluded
that the creation of a contractual payment right in favor of the em-
ployee was not a taxable event.83 In the process, the ruling announced
that "[a] mere promise to pay, not represented by notes or secured in
any way, is not regarded as a receipt of income within the intendment
of the cash receipts and disbursements method."84 The IRS reached a
different conclusion, however, in the context of a second-party payment
obligation that had been irrevocably funded. In Example 4 of the rul-
ing, the employer paid a signing bonus to an escrow agent.85 Pursuant
to the escrow agreement, the agent was required to distribute to the
employee such amount (plus interest) in installments over a five-year
period.86 If the employee died prior to expiration of the five-year term,
the remaining payments were to be made to his estate.87 Citing Sproull,
the IRS determined that the signing bonus constituted income to the
employee in the year in which the employer deposited the bonus in
escrow.86
3. A Unifying Theme
The authorities addressing third-party promises (e.g., Brodie and
Dreschei) and the authorities addressing funded second-party promises
a See id. at 247-48.
31 See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
82 Id.
* See id.
8 Id. A similar statement concerning second-party payment obligations was later made
by the Tax Court in Centre v. Conunissionc; 55 T.C. 16, 19 (1970): "The naked promise of an
employer to pay compensation at some future date for services currently rendered is not
income to a cash basis employee." Using the cash method's terminology, a naked promise of
any employer is not an item of property. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (1) (i) (as amended in
2006) (requiring "cash, property, or services" to be included in income in the taxable year in
which they are received).
8 See Rev. Rul. 60-31. Example 3 of the ruling involved a mere promise to pay issued by a
book publisher to an author. The example shows that the ruling's principles apply equally in
the independent contractor context as they do in the employment context. See id.
86 Id.
87 See id. at 176-77.
8 Id. at 180.
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(e.g., McEwen, Sproull, and Revenue Ruling 60-31) share a unifying con-
ceptual theme: the taxpayer's rights to future payment are not subject
to the insolvency risk of the second party to the transaction that gave
rise to the promise to pay.89 In other words, in both contexts the tax-
payer could receive full payment even if the second party became insol-
vent. Indeed, the similarity of these two strands of the common-law
economic benefit doctrine was illustrated in Revenue Ruling 69-50,90
which addressed the tax consequences to a physician in a third-party
insurance arrangement. In that ruling, a health insurer permitted its
participating physicians to irrevocably elect to defer a stated percentage
of payments that the insurer owed the physician for treating its patient-
subscribers.9' Stressing that the physician had provided medical ser-
vices to the patient (as opposed to the health insurer), the ruling held
that the deferred amounts were currently taxable to the physician un-
der the economic benefit doctrine.92 This analysis would appear to be a
straightforward application of the third-party promise rule set forth in
Brodie and Dresche. 93 To support its conclusion, however, Revenue Rul-
ing 69-50 described the patients as "fund[ing]" their payment obliga-
tions to the physicians with the medical insurance company's promises
to pay.94 Revenue Ruling 69-50 thus appears to meld the third-party
promise strand of the economic benefit doctrine together with the
funded second-party promise strand.9 5
Nevertheless, regardless of the specific terminology used (i.e.,
third-party promise or funded second-party promise), the economic
benefit doctrine provides that contractual payment obligations are
treated as property under the cash method in all cases where the re-
cipient is protected from the credit risk of the other party to the trans-
action in which the payment obligation arose.96 This is an exception to
the general rule that contractual payment obligations are not treated as
property under the cash method.97
89 Sec supra notes 54-88 and accompanying text.
9 Rev. Rul. 69-50, 1969-1 C.B. 140.
91 Id.
92 See id.
9 Although the physicians performed services for the benefit of the patient-subscribers,
they received promises to pay from the medical insurance company. The insurer was a third
party to the compensation-for-medical-services transaction that gave rise to the promises.
9 Rev. Rul. 69-50.
9 Sce id.
96 See, e.g., Dresche,; 179 F.2d at 865; Sproult, 16 T.C. at 247-48.
9 Another exception exists for contractual obligations that can be readily liquidated.
See Cowden v. Comm'r, 289 F.2d 20, 23 (5th Cir. 1961). This so-called "cash equivalency"
doctrine is far more limited, however, as it depends on the ability of the payee to assign the
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The economic benefit doctrine represents a sensible application of
the cash method of accounting. Recall that the cash method's impreci-
sion is justified in terms of administrability.98 The general exclusion of
second-party promises ensures that garden-variety accounts receivable
and similar payment rights are taxed as they are paid, not when they
are created. This rule is easy to apply and it avoids valuation and liquid-
ity concerns. In these respects, third-party promises differ significantly
from second-party promises. Unlike second-party promises, third-party
promises are not created simply through the performance of services;
instead, they involve some degree of negotiation between all three par-
ties. This aspect makes it easy to determine precisely when third-party
promises are created.99 In addition, third-party promises are almost al-
ways purchased for cash. As a result, subjecting third-party promises to
immediate taxation will not implicate valuation or liquidity concerns. 00
III. STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS OF PHYSICAL INJURY DAMAGES
Having explained that third-party promises as well as funded sec-
ond-party promises have traditionally been regarded as property for
obligation "at a discount not substantially greater than the generally prevailing premium
for the use of money." See id. at 24. Accordingly, only negotiable instruments of highly sol-
vent obligors would potentially be treated as cash under this doctrine.
9 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
99 For example, consider a typical account receivable. A promises to pay B $500 if and
when B drafts A's will. The promise to pay is created when B actually drafts the will. At that
time, under an accrual regime, B would recognize the $500 of income. In a two-party ar-
rangement, treating the promise to pay as property would result in the realization event
occurring when rights accrue, which can be difficult to determine. In a three-party ar-
rangement (and in funded, two-party arrangements), the taxable event would generally
coincide with the issuance of the promise to pay from the third party.
100 Because three-party arrangements are negotiated and third-party promises are pur-
chased for cash, any purported liquidity burden would be entirely self-imposed. A payor
would be indifferent between paying cash to the payee and paying cash to a third party for
the benefit of the payee. If the payee directs the payor to pay cash to the third party, the
payee has no cause to complain about any resulting liquidity burden. This payment of cash
also makes valuation of the third-party promise rudimentary. Furthermore, because funded
second-party promises involve the deposit of cash into a trust or escrow account from which
future payments will be made, imposing immediate taxation on funded second-party prom-
ises will not create valuation or liquidity problems.
In addition, in the two-party context, substitute taxation is often imposed on the payor,
and this substitute taxation usually offsets (in whole or in part) the tax benefit received by the
payee. See supra note 35 (describing how, in nonqualified deferred compensation arrange-
ments, a substitute tax is imposed on the employer). In the third-party context, there often is
no substitute taxation imposed on any of the parties. For example, in the structured settle-
ment context, there is no substitute taxation imposed on the defendant (or its insurer) or the
SSC. See infra notes 235-262 and accompanying text. The possible absence of substitute taxa-
tion also militates in favor of treating third-party promises differently.
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cash method purposes, the discussion can now return to the taxation of
structured settlements. These arrangements fall within the third-party
promise category, as the structured settlement company has no preex-
isting relationship with the plaintiff to whom it issues its promise to pay.
Under the cases and IRS rulings previously described, the SSC obliga-
tion, therefore, would be treated as property under the cash method. 101
Consequently, receipt of the SSC obligation would ordinarily constitute
an event with tax significance. 102 These general rules, however, have
been altered to some extent in the context of payments of damages for
physical injury claims. 103
A. Defendant as Obligor
Before the enactment of the Periodic Payment Settlement Act of
1982 ("PPSA"),104 there existed some uncertainty over how the I.R.C.
§ 104(a) (2) exclusion from gross income for damages received on ac-
count of a personal injury applied to structured settlements of such
claims. 105 Specifically, it was not clear whether a personal injury plain-
tiff who received a structured settlement could exclude the entirety of
each periodic payment as it was received, or whether the exclusion ex-
tended only to the present value of the future payment stream. If the
exclusion were limited to the present value, then the subsequent yield
on this value would be taxable. The IRS previously had ruled that ex-
plicit investment yield-that is, the yield generated by the plaintiff's
investment of a lump-sum recovery-fell outside the scope of I.R.C.
§ 104(a) (2) and therefore was taxable.10 6 The issue was whether the
same rule would apply to the implicit investment yield embedded
within the structured settlement.
Under general cash-method principles, the application of the
I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) exclusion to structured settlements would seem
clear. If the defendant remained obligated to make the future pay-
101 See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
102 See United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1950) (noting that, be-
cause the plaintiff received an economic benefit, "[w]hatever present value the life insur-
ance feature had to him [was] clearly taxable.").
103 See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
104 Periodic Payment Settlement Act of 1982, Pub L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2605, 2605
(1983). This legislation added the parenthetical language to I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) clarifying
that the exclusion provided in the statute extended to damages received in prosecution for
a claim for a personal injury or sickness "whether as lump sums or as periodic payments."
Id. § 101(a).
105 I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) (2006).
106 See Rev. Rul. 76-133, 1976-1 C.B. 34; Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59.
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ments to the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be left with a mere promise to
pay from the second party to the transaction.107 In the tort context, the
"transaction" is the event that precipitated the litigation. Because sec-
ond-party obligations are disregarded under the cash method, any in-
come tax consequences resulting from the plaintiffs receipt of the de-
fendant's promise would be deferred until the periodic payments were
received by the plaintiff. Only at that point would the payment of dam-
ages be tested for exclusion under I.R.C. § 104(a) (2). Accordingly, the
deferred payments would qualify for the I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) exclusion to
the same extent as if they had been paid immediately upon settlement,
even though the deferred payments clearly include an investment yield
component.
The IRS confirmed the foregoing analysis of defendant-issued pay-
ment obligations in Revenue Ruling 77-230.08 In that ruling, the
United States had established a trust to pay the future medical ex-
penses of an individual who was physically injured at a government fa-
cility.'09 Any funds remaining in the trust upon the individual's death
would revert back to the United States.110 Because of this reversion
right, the United States was considered to be the owner of the trust as-
sets for tax purposes and the trust was disregarded as a separate en-
tity."' The trust obligations to make future medical payments therefore
were treated as obligations of the United States, which was the second
party to the transaction." 2 For this reason, the ruling determined that
all amounts distributed from the trust (including the income generated
on investment of the trust assets) would be excluded from gross in-
come under I.R.C. § 104(a) (2).113
B. Defendant's Insurer as Obligor
Prior to the enactment of the PPSA in 1982, the analysis was less
clear if the payment obligation to the plaintiff was issued by the defen-
dant's liability insurer instead of the defendant itself. Because the in-
107 This assumes that the defendant's contractual obligation was not funded (e.g.,
through an escrow or trust arrangement).
10 Rev. Rul. 77-230, 1977-2 C.B. 214.
109 Id.
110 Id.
I See id.; see also I.R.C. § 677(a) (2) (2006). Hence, the income generated through the
investment of the trust assets would be taxed to the grantor. In this particular case, how-
ever, the trust income was not taxed because the United States was the grantor.
" See Rev. Rul. 77-230.
113 Id.
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surer constituted a third party to the transaction that gave rise to the
payment obligation (i.e., the event that caused the plaintiff's injury),
the insurer's promise to pay would constitute property under the prin-
ciples articulated in Brodie v. Commissione; United States v. Dreschei; and
Revenue Ruling 69-50.114 Nonetheless, in a pair of revenue rulings is-
sued in 1979, the IRS concluded that the plaintiffs receipt of an obliga-
tion of the defendant's insurer was not a receipt of property.115
In Revenue Ruling 79-220,116 the defendant's liability insurer
promised to make periodic payments to the plaintiff to settle the plain-
tiff's personal injury claim. The insurer purchased an annuity to pro-
vide a source of liquidity that it could use to satisfy its obligations to the
plaintiff, but the insurer retained all ownership rights in the annuity'' 7
Accordingly, the annuity purchased by the insurer remained subject to
the claims of the insurer's creditors. 118 Because of this, the IRS held
that the insurer's promise did not implicate the economic benefit doc-
trine.'19 As a result, the cash payments received by the plaintiff over
time constituted the relevant damages recovery to be excluded under
I.R.C. § 104(a) (2).120 Implicit in this conclision is that the obligation of
the insurer was not property under the cash method even though it
appeared to be a third-party promise.
Revenue Ruling 79-220 was not an aberration. Shortly after its re-
lease, the government reinforced it with Revenue Ruling 79-313.121 Un-
der the facts of this latter ruling, a defendant's insurer agreed to make
fifty annual payments to the plaintiff for damages sustained in an auto-
mobile accident. 122 After stressing that the insurance carrier did not seg-
regate its assets in a manner that would protect the plaintiff in the event
of the insurer's insolvency, the ruling summarily concluded that the
"1 Sc supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
115 As a technical matter, the rulings concluded that the creation of the payment obli-
gation was not currently taxable to the plaintiff. Yet in terms of the rule of income recog-
nition under the cash method of accounting, the holdings of the rulings necessarily imply
that the IRS did not view the contractual payment obligations as property for this purpose.
116 Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74.
117 Id.
118 In the words of the ruling, the plaintiff "can rely on only the general credit of [the
liability insurer] for collection of the monthly payments." Id.; cf Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1971-1
C.B. 127 (explaining that the purchase of an annuity by employer to provide liquidity to
make payments of nonqualified deferred compensation did not operate to fund irrevoca-
bly the employer's payment obligation because the employer retained ownership of the
annuity and thereby subjected the annuity to the claims of its general creditors).
1' Sec Rev. Rul. 79-220.
120 See id.
I1 Rev. Rul. 79-313, 1979-2 C.B. 75.
12 Id.
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plaintiff did not realize the economic benefit of the present value of the
future payment stream. 123 Accordingly, the periodic cash payments re-
ceived pursuant to the structured settlement would be excluded under
I.R.C. § 104(a) (2).124 Again, the implication is that the insurer's obliga-
tion was not treated as property under the cash method.125
The conclusions of Revenue Rulings 79-220 and 79-313 are diffi-
cult to reconcile with the common-law economic benefit doctrine.'26
Under the Brodie and Drescher decisions, an insurer's contractual obliga-
tion to make future payments to a taxpayer that had no prior relation-
ship with the insurer was determined to provide a taxable economic
benefit to the taxpayer.127 These authorities appear inconsistent with
the conclusions in these rulings.
The rulings also are inconsistent with Revenue Ruling 69-50,
whose fact pattern is almost perfectly analogous.128 In Revenue Ruling
69-50, a medical insurer had a pre-existing contract with its patient-
subscribers that obligated the insurer to pay their medical costs.129 Pur-
suant to the medical insurance contract, the insurer became obligated
to make future payments to the physicians who provided treatment to
the patient-subscribers.130 The implication of Revenue Ruling 69-50,
which taxed the physicians on the value of the insurer's promises when
they were issued, is that the medical insurer was a third party to the
physician-patient relationship, despite the pre-existing contractual obli-
gations of the medical insurer towards the patient.' 3' Stated differently,
the pre-existing contractual relationship did not cause the medical in-
surer to step into the shoes of the patient and become the "second
party" to the compensation-for-medical-services transaction that gave
rise to the contractual payment obligation. 3 2 In each of the 1979 rul-
ings, the liability insurer had a pre-existing contract with the defendant
that obligated the insurer to pay the defendant's liability costs. Pursuant
to this contract, the insurer made promises to make future payments to
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Sec id.
126 Sec Frolik, supra note 1, at 580 (expressing surprise that the IRS did not apply the
economic benefit doctrine in Rev. Rul. 79-220).
127 Sec Drcschei,; 179 F.2d at 865-66; Brodie v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 275, 282-84 (1942).
128 See Rev. Rul, 69-50, 1969-1 C.B. 140.
129 Id.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 Sce id.
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the plaintiff.133 To be consistent with Revenue Ruling 69-50, the IRS in
the 1979 rulings should have determined that the pre-existing liability
insurance contract did not cause the insurer to step into the shoes of
the second party and that the I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) exclusion therefore
applied only to the present value of the insurer's promise.
Unfortunately, Revenue Rulings 79-220 and 79-313 do not discuss
or even mention Brodie, Dresche,; or Revenue Ruling 69-50. It is there-
fore unclear whether the drafters of the 1979 rulings simply did not
consider or respect these precedents, or whether the drafters distin-
guished them in some way. It is unlikely that the drafters would have
intentionally undermined these long-standing authorities, as doing so
would have considerable consequences on the taxation of nonqualified
deferred compensation arrangements.13 4 More likely, the drafters of
the 1979 rulings may have distinguished Brodie, Dresche; and Revenue
Ruling 69-50 on the basis that these latter authorities arose in the con-
text of compensation for services-not in the context of recoveries in
tort. Thus, the 1979 rulings may imply that the cash method principles
are somehow different for tort recoveries. Perhaps the definition of a
second-party promise is broader in the tort context such that it encom-
passes promises made by insurers who have previously assumed con-
tractual liability for tort liabilities of the defendant. 135 Although such a
rule would explain the divergence of the 1979 rulings from the well-
established cash method principles that arose in the deferred compen-
sation context, there appears to be no support in the Internal Revenue
Code or the Treasury Regulations for the proposition that the general
rules of the cash method are in fact different in the tort context.
C. Third-Party Assiguee as Obligor
Not long after the publication of the 1979 revenue rulings, Con-
gress clarified the tax treatment of structured settlements of claims cov-
ered by I.R.C. § 104(a) (2).136 In the PPSA, Congress amended I.R.C.
§ 104(a) (2) to provide expressly that the exclusion from gross income
applied to all damages received on account of personal injury "whether
133 See Rev. Rul. 79-313, 1979-2 C.B. 75; Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74.
134 See supra note 35 (explaining the taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation).
135 See Rev. Rul. 79-313; Rev. Rul. 79-220.
136 See Periodic Payment Settlement Act of 1982, Pub L. No. 97-473, § 101(a), 96 Stat.
2605, 2605 (1983). At the time, I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) excluded from gross income damages
received on account of a personal injury. The statute subsequently was amended to limit
the exclusion to damages received on account of personal physical injuries.
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as lump sums or as periodic payments."13 7 The legislative history dem-
onstrates that Congress did not seek to effect meaningful change with
its elaboration on the I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) exclusion; rather, Congress
simply intended to confirm the administrative approach previously
taken by the IRS.138 Citing Revenue Rulings 79-220 and 77-230, the re-
ports of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance
Committee indicated that the amendment was "intended to codify,
rather than change, present law."139 According to the Conference
Committee that reconciled the House and Senate bills, the PPSA ex-
plicitly extended the exclusion from gross income for personal injury
damages to amounts paid out of a fund "invested and owned by the
tortfeasor or an insurer."140 Thits, Congress provided legislative ratifica-
tion of the status quo tax treatment of plaintiffs who received periodic
payments of I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) damages from the defendant or its in-
surer.141 This treatment is fully consistent with the general cash method
principle that unfunded secoiid-party promises are not property for
cash method purposes if a liability insurer is deemed to "step into the
shoes" of its insured as a second party. 142
Despite the statements in the legislative history that Congress in-
tended merely to ratify, existing administrative practice, the PPSA in fact
significantly altered the taxation of structured settlements in cases
where the defendant or its insurer assigns its payment obligations to a
third-party SSC. In addition to amending I.R.C. § 104(a) (2), Congress
enacted I.R.C. § 130 to address the tax consequences that arise when an
SSC receives a cash payment to assume the obligation to make periodic
payments to a plaintiff in cases covered by I.R.C. § 104(a) (2).143 Spe-
13 Id.
138 See S. REP. No. 97-646, at 4 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 97-832, at 4 (1982).
139 S. REP. No. 97-646, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 97-832, at 4. In each report, the respective
committees explained that, notwithstanding the administrative guidance supplied by the IRS
addressing the application of the economic benefit doctrine to periodic damages payments,
"it would be helpful to taxpayers to prpvide statutory certainty in the area." S. REP. No. 97-
646, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 97-832, at 4. Furthermore, the conference committee report accom-
panying the enacted bill also emphasized that "no negative inference should be drawn as to
the appropriate tax treatment of such transactions under present law and administrative
rulings." H.R. REP. No.97-984, at 12 (1982) (Conf. Rep.).
140 H.R. REP. No. 97-984, at 12.
141 Sec id.
142 Cf supra notes 115-125 and accompanying text (describing 1979 rulings that al-
lowed for exclusion of periodic payments made by liability insurer to plaintiff).
143 See Periodic Payment Settlement Act of 1982, Pub L. No. 97-473, § 101(b), 96 Stat.
2605, 2605-06 (1983). For an enlightening description of the lobbying effort mounted by
the insurance industry leading to the enactment of I.R.C. § 130, see Richard B. Risk, Jr.,
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cifically, Congress provided an exclusion from gross income for
amounts received by an SSC in consideration for agreeing to a "quali-
fied assignment."144 In general, a "qualified assignment" is an assign-
ment of the liability by the defendant or its insurer to make periodic
payments of damages that are excluded from the plaintiffs gross in-
come tinder I.R.C. § 104(a) (2).145 A "qualified funding asset" generally
means an annuity, provided that the annuity is used by the SSC to fund
its payment obligations.146
Although the I.R.C. § 130 exclusion by its terms specifically ad-
dresses only the tax consequences to the SSC, it is clear that Congress
intended for qualified assignments to have no effect on the plaintiffs
tax consequences.147 That is, Congress intended that plaintiffs would be
taxed the same regardless of whether the, defendant or insurer retained
its payment obligations or made a qualified assignment thereof. By en-
acting I.R.C. § 130, Congress implicitly abrogated the general rule that
a third-party promise is an item of property in the I.R.C. § 104(a) (2)
con text. 148
Comment, Structured Scttleiments: The Ongoing Evolution from a Liability Insurer's Ploy to an
Injury Victim's Boon, 36 TULSA L.J. 865, 874 (2001).
144 I.R.C. § 130(a) (2006). The exclusion applies only to the extent that the cash pay-
ment received by the SSC does not exceed the cost of the qualified funding asset, such as
an annuity. See id.
Whether the statutory exclusion provided by I.R.C. § 130(a) is necessary is not entirely
clear. Prior to the enactment of the PPSA, the IRS issued conflicting private rulings on this
issue. Compare I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-48-073 (Aug. 31, 1982) (refusing to characterize the
fee paid to the SSC as loan proceeds, noting that the SSC "is not repaying the obligee, but
is paying a third party designated by the obligee"), with I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-38-044
(June 24, 1980) (excluding the fee paid to the SSC from gross income, reasoning that "the
transaction is not, in the economic sense, materially different from a simpl[e] two party
loan transaction"). Payments received in exchange for the assumption of a payment obli-
gation to a third party pose difficult issues under the income tax. Sce generally Robert H.
Scarborough, Property Purchase or Payment in Kind? The Oxford Paper Con undrann, 62 TAX
LAW. 823 (2009) (explaining that such transactions could be viewed as (a) a purchase of
property/cash for a contingent liability that gives rise to basis as payments are made (the
Purchase Model) or (b) a receipt of fee income by the taxpayer that supports deductions
when payments of the assumed obligation are made (the Fee Model)).
14 See I.R.C. § 130(c).
146 See id. § 130(d). An annuity that serves as a "qualified funding asset" is exempt from
the application of I.R.C. § 72(u), which generally subjects a corporate-owned annuity to
current taxation on the inside build-up. See id. § 72(u)(3) (C). For further discussion of
I.R.C. § 72(u) and its relevance to structured settlements, see infra notes 259-262 and ac-
companying text.
147 I.R.C. § 130.
14 A careful parsing of I.R.C. § 130 proves this implicit abrogation. I.R.C. § 130 defines
a qualified assignment as one under which "the periodic payments are excludable from
the gross income of the recipient under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 104(a)." Id.
§ 130(c) (2) (D). If the traditional third-party rule was applicable, then the purchase by a
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This abrogation may be defensible as a policy matter. By not treat-
ing an SSC obligation as an item of property under the cash method,
Congress provided a tax advantage to structured settlement partici-
pants by exempting the embedded investment yield from taxation.149
Although many justifications have been offered for this tax subsidy, the
Joint Committee on Taxation has suggested that Congress offered this
subsidy in an attempt to minimize social costs that result when an in-
jured plaintiff over-consumes or otherwise mismanages a lump-sum
award of damages intended to finance future medical costs.15 0 Yet given
that I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) covers all damages on account of personal inju-
ries (including compensation for pain and suffering and lost wages)
and not just future medical expenses, the yield exemption is best
viewed simply as a tax incentive for certain plaintiffs to invest their liti-
gation recoveries. In any event, if Congress intends for the tax incentive
in favor of structured settlements to be effective, it makes little sense to
force plaintiffs to invest their litigation recoveries in a debt instrument
of the particular defendant that harmed them or that of the particular
defendant's insurer. By abrogating the third-party rule in the I.R.C.
§ 104(a) (2) context, Congress permits a plaintiff to shop around to se-
lect the annuity product that best satisfies the plaintiff's investment
goals' 51 without sacrificing the tax benefit of yield exemption.15 2
defendant (insurer) of the SSC obligation in favor of the plaintiff would be treated the
same as if the plaintiff received a present, lump-sum payment of damages. Accordingly, the
present value of the payment obligation would be excluded from gross income under
I.R.C. § 104(a) (2), and the I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) exclusion would have no further application.
The periodic payments would therefore not be excluded from gross income under I.R.C.
§ 104(a) (2) as required under I.R.C. § 130; rather, the tax treatment of those payments
would be governed by the annuity rules provided in I.R.C. § 72. As a result, if the tradi-
tional third-party rule applied, it would be impossible for any assignments to qualify under
I.R.C. § 130, which would render the provision useless. To avoid such an absurdity, it must
be assumed that Congress implicitly abrogated the traditional third-party promise rule in
the I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) context. See Richard B. Risk, Jr., A Case for the Ugcnt Nced to Claify
Tax Treatment of a Qualified Settlement Fund Created for a Single Claimant, 23 VA. TAX REv. 639,
656 (2004) ("Congress expressed its intent that, in structured settlements, the judicial
doctrine of economic benefit does not apply simply because a sum is set aside irrevocably
for the payee's sole benefit . . . .").
149 See supra notes 28-31 ;1rd accompanying text (describing the yield exemption benefit).
150 See STAFF OF JOINT CONIN. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., TAX TREATMENT OF STRUc-
TURED SETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTs 4-5 (1999), available at http://www.jct.go/jct-html/x-
15-99.htm (describing congressional policy behind the tax subsidy for structured settle-
ments). But see Scales, supra note 38, at 869-74 (challenging the myth of the squandering
plaintiff).
151 One might expect that plaintiffs will most commonly choose highly rated SSCs to
minimize the risk of default. Regardless of the plaintiffs diligence in selecting a highly
rated insurance company to serve as the SSC, the plaintiff still may be subject to some
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IV. STRUCTURED ATTORNEY'S FEES
Part III explains that Congress has statutorily abrogated the tradi-
tional third-party promise rule in the I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) context.'5 3
Outside of this specific context, however, it would appear that the third-
party promise rule would continue to apply to other types of structured
arrangements. Attorneys who structure their fees, however, have ar-
gued otherwise. In particular, structuring attorneys have argued that
rights to future payments from parties other than their clients (i.e., the
second party to the legal services transaction) are not "property."154
A. Section 83-A Context-Specific Codification of the Economic Benefit Doctrine
In 1969, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 83, which in general provides
that a taxpayer who performs services resulting in a transfer of "prop-
erty" is taxed on the property's fair market value at the time the prop-
erty is received.155 Accordingly, if a taxpayer receives a contractual pay-
ment obligation as compensation for services, the issue under I.R.C.
§ 83 is the familiar issue of whether the obligation constitutes property.
Although the statute is silent as to the definition of property, it is gen-
erally accepted that Congress intended to codify the economic benefit
degree of default risk, particularly in the current precarious economic environment,
where the solvency of even the most established insurance companies is not beyond ques-
tion. See Ron Lieber, Your Insurance Company, and Related W1onies, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 15, 2008,
at B1 (discussing a physically injured plaintiff who "put the proceeds" of a legal settlement
into an annuity issued by an insurance company that subsequently collapsed).
152 Despite this tax advantage afforded to structured settlements of personal injury
claims, the Joint Committee on Taxation found that a majority of personal injury awards
are paid through lump sums. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., TAX
ThEATMENT OF STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS 2. TheJoint Committee offered a
number of explanations for the failure of plaintiffs to avail themselves of the ability to in-
vest effectively their damage awards on a tax-free basis, one of which was that defendants
are attempting to capture the benefit of the tax subsidy by making lower structured settle-
ment offers. Id. at 5; see also Scales, supra note 38, at 884 (noting that "there is no real dis-
pute that structured settlements save defendants money"), 895-96 (proposing that I.R.C.
§ 72 be amended to permit plaintiffs who receive lump sum damages award to purchase an
annuity of their choosing and still receive a tax-exempt investment yield as a means of
eliminating the defendant's negotiation leverage over the tax subsidy). Another reason for
the failure of plaintiffs to take advantage of the structured settlement subsidy is that their
preference for current consumption is not overcome by the prospect of earning a tax-free
investment yield. Yet another possibility is that the effective rate of tax on capital income is
low, which would mean that the tax advantage is small. See Calvin H. Johnson, A Thentnomc-
ter for the Tax System: The Overall Health ofthe Tax System as Mcasured by hIplicit Tax, 56 SMU L.
REV. 13, 21-32 (2003).
1-s See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
154 See infra notes 154-190 and accompanying text.
i55 See I.R.C. § 83(a) (2006).
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doctrine that had developed in the case law. 156 Consistent with this
understanding, Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) defines "property" for purposes
of the statute as follows:
[T]he term "property" includes real and personal property
other than either money or an unfunded and unsecured promise
to pay money or property in the future. The term also includes
a beneficial interest in assets (including money) which are transferred
or set aside from the claims of creditors of the transferon; for example,
in a trust or escrow account. 15 7
Note the similarities between this definition and the traditional
economic benefit doctrine. 58 Both are consistent with the notion that,
in order to defer tax upon receipt of a contractual payment obligation,
the recipient of the obligation must retain the status of a general unse-
cured creditor of the second party to the transaction.159
B. Childs v. Commissioner
The Tax Court wrestled with the definition of property under I.R.C.
§ 83 when it addressed the tax consequences of structured attorney's
fees in Childs v. Commissioner in 1994.160 The taxpayers were lawyers vho
had executed a contingent fee agreement with a personal injury cli-
ent.161 The litigation eventually was settled, with both the client and the
attorneys structuring their respective litigation recoveries.16 2 Specifically,
the defendant's insurer agreed to make certain payments to the client
and to the attorneys, and the insurer then assigned its obligation to
156 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-36-001 (May 12, 1993) ("Section 83 of the Code is
generally believed to be a codification of the economic benefit doctrine as it applies to
transfers of property as remuneration for services."); Patricia Ann Metzer, Constructive Re-
ceipt, Economic Benefit and Assignment of Income: A Case Study in Deferred Compensation, 29 TAX
L. REv. 525, 552 (1974) ("Section 83 both codifies and expands the common-law notions
of economic benefit as they relate to property transferred in connection with the perform-
ance of services.").
157 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 2005) (emphasis added). For background
on the development of this regulatory definition, see BrantJ. Hellwig, Nonqualified Deferred
Compensation and the Pre-Statutory Limits on Deferral, in BENDER'S FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF RETIREMENT PLANS § 13.03[21 [a] (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2008); Gregg D. Polsky & BrantJ.
Hellvig, Taxing the Promisc to Pay, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1092, 1125-27 (2005).
158 See, e.g., United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 864-65 (2d Cir. 1950).
159 See id. at 865-66.
160 103 T.C. 634, 648-53 (1994), aff'd, 89 F.3d 856 (11th Cir. 1996).
161 See id. at 637.
162 See id. at 640.
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make these payments to an SSC.163 The SSC thereafter purchased an
annuity to fund its assumed payment obligations. 164 The Childs case ad-
dressed the tax consequences of the arrangement to the attorneys.165
The precise issue was whether the attorneys recognized income upon
the creation of the structured arrangement or only as the scheduled
cash payments were received. 166 Resolution of the issue turned on
whether the contractual payment obligations issued by the SSC to the
attorneys constituted "property" for purposes of I.R.C. § 83.167
As previously described, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 83 against the
backdrop of the common-law economic benefit doctrine, and eco-
nomic benefit principles were incorporated into the definition in
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e). 168 Under the well-established principles of Bro-
die v. Connissione; United States v. Dreschei; and Revenue Ruling 69-50, if
a service provider receives a contractual payment obligation of a person
other than the sernice recipient, the service provider is deemed to re-
ceive property. 169 Although Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) does not limit ex-
plicitly the scope of contractual payment obligations that are excluded
from the definition of property to promises issued by the service recipi-
ent, 170 such a limitation was so well engrained in the doctrine that it did
not warrant specific articulation. There is no evidence that Congress
intended to reverse the well-established third-party promise rule-a
principle that "dates from the dawn of federal tax law"171 -through the
enactment of I.R.C. § 83.172
163 Sec id. at 640-41.
164 Id. at 643. The attorneys were named as the annuitants under the annuity, and their
respective estates were designated as contingent beneficiaries of their share. The SSC,
however, remained the owner of the annuity.
165 See id. at 648-53.
166 The tax consequences to the client were not in dispute. Based on the facts, the cli-
ent's structured settlement would appear to be covered by I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) and, accord-
ingly, the client would have been able to exclude all of the periodic payments from gross
income.
167 Childs, 103 T.C. at 653.
16s Sec I.R.C. § 83 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 2005).
169 See Dreschet; 179 F.2d at 865-66; Brodie v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 275, 282-84 (1942); Rev.
Rul. 69-50, 1969-1 C.B. 140.
170 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e).
171 George L. White, 570-2nd Tax Mgmt. (BNA) Accounting Methods-General Prin-
ciples, at A-72 n.877 (2004).
172 See id. at A-72 (stating that, although I.R.C. § 83 excludes unfunded and unsecured
obligations from the definition of property, "[i]f the transfer is of obligations of a third
party, they are 'property.'"); see also JOSEPH DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAx: Doc-
TRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLIcy 748 n.3 (2d ed. 1999) (reaching the same conclusion). If
Congress had intended to reverse the third-party promise rule, then the enactment of
I.R.C. § 83 would not have codified the economic benefit doctrine; rather, it would have
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Returning to the facts of Childs, the case should have been resolved
rather easily in favor of the IRS. The attorneys provided their services
to their client, and their client compensated them by agreeing to a set-
tlement pursuant to which the attorneys received a payment obligation
issued by the SSC, a clear third party to the attorney-client relation-
ship.173 The client's assignment of the SSC obligation to the attor-
neys,174 therefore, constituted payment of the attorney's contingent fee
obliterated it. But see I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-36-001 (May 12, 1993) ("Section 83 of the
Code is generally believed to be a codification of the economic benefit doctrine as it ap-
plies to transfers of property as remuneration for services."); McKEE ET AL., supra note 47,
at 5-6 (noting that "[a]s broadly applicable as it is, § 83 was not intended to supplant the
substantial body of law governing deferred compensation arrangements"); Metzer, supra
note 156, at 552 ("Section 83 both codifies and expands the common law notions of eco-
nomic benefit as they relate to property transferred in connection with the performance
of services.").
us See Childs, 103 T.C. at 640-41.
17 In Commissioner v. Banks, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that, in a contingent
fee arrangement, the entire recovery (including any portion that is paid to the attorney
pursuant to the fee agreement) constitutes gross income to the plaintiff. 543 U.S. 426,
433-37 (2005). The plaintiff is then treated as paying the attorney. Accordingly, the fact
that the SSC obligation may not, as a formal matter, run through the plaintiff would not
change the conclusion that the plaintiff is compensating the attorney with a third-party
promise.
The conclusion in Banks that the attorney fee portion of the award is deemed to "flow
through" the plaintiff on its way to the attorney may result in an unintended application of
an excise tax that is imposed on structured settlement factoring transactions. In 2002,
Congress enacted I.R.C. § 5891, which imposes an excise tax on certain sales of physical
injury structured settlements. Congress apparently was concerned that plaintiffs were sell-
ing their rights to future payments to factoring companies at excessive discounts. See STAFF
Of jOINT Cosisi. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., TAX TREATMENT OF STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT
ARRANGEMENTs 6 (noting that the imposition of the tax on the amount of the discount
served a consumer protection goal). The excise tax is imposed whenever structured set-
tlements that qualify under I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) are "transfer[red] ... for consideration by
means of sale, assignment, pledge, or other form of encumbrance" unless the transfer is
approved in advance by a court order. I.R.C. § 5891(c) (3) (2006). To avoid the excise tax,
the court order must determine, among other things, that the transfer "is in the best in-
terest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee's depend-
ents." Id. § 5891 (b) (2) (ii). In the absence of such a court order, an excise tax is imposed
on the transferee equal to forty percent of the amount of the factoring discount. Id.
§ 5891(a). The factoring discount is equal to the excess of the total undiscounted future
payments owed to the transferee over the present value of the future payments. See id.
§ 5891(c) (4).
Under Banks, a structured attorney's fee arrangement is deemed to flow through the
plaintiff. The attorney's right to receive future payments is treated as first received by the
plaintiff and then immediately re-transferred from the plaintiff to the attorney in satisfac-
tion of the plaintiffs contractual obligation to pay the attorney for legal services. Unless a
court order specifically approves the re-transfer of the payment rights from the plaintiff to
the attorney, in compliance with the specific requirements of I.R.C. § 5891, a significant
excise tax would appear to be imposed on the attorney at the time the structured fee ar-
rangement is created. This result was not intended by Congress, which was interested in
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in the form of property.17' The attorneys, as a consequence, should
have recognized income immediately to the extent of the fair market
value of the SSC obligation, which could be readily determined by ref-
erence to the purchase price of the annuity.
The Tax Court, however, reached the opposite conclusion.176 In its
analysis, the court simply missed the second-party versus third-party is-
sue. The court focused on the question of whether the SSC obligation
was "funded" or "secured" within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.83-
3(e).177 In this manner, the Tax Court mistakenly evaluated the pay-
ment obligations of the SSC just as they would have evaluated payment
obligations of the client (i.e., the second party) 178 Because the attor-
neys were relying on the general creditworthiness of the SSC, the court
determined that the SSC obligation was neither funded nor secured
protecting plaintiffs from selling their payment rights to factoring companies at huge dis-
counts. Nevertheless, the excise tax would appear to apply based on the terms of the stat-
ute and the Supreme Court's analysis in Banks.
175 One could view the client as irrevocably funding the promise to pay the attorney a
contingent fee with the SSC obligation. Cf. Rev. Rul. 69-50, 1969-1 C.B. 140 (treating pa-
tient-subscriber as funding his promise to his physician with a medical insurer's promise to
pay). Yet, regardless of whether one interprets the arrangement as the transfer of a third-
party obligation or the funding of a second-party obligation, the result is the same: the SSC
obligation issued in the attorney's favor constitutes property tinder I.R.C. § 83, and the
attorney is required to include the fair market value of the SSC obligation in gross income
at that time.
176 Sec Childs, 103 TC. at 653.
177 See id. at 649.
178 The only plausible way of justifying the result in Childs is to characterize the pay-
ment obligations as having been issued by the plaintiff to the attorney. As explained by the
IRS in a Coordinated Issue Paper that touched on the Ciilds decision:
In essence, the service recipient (the plaintiff) established a portion of its
own funds (the potential settlement) as the only source from which the ser-
vice provider would be paid. Although technically the service provider re-
ceived a promise from the third party (the defendant), the service provider in
substance continued to possess an unsecured interest in a portion of the ser-
vice recipient's ftinds (the potential settlement which otherwise would have
been paid to the service recipient), which would not be available until the set-
tlement was paid.
I.R.S. Coordinated Issue Paper 9300.28-00 (Oct. 1, 2004). The distinction that the IRS
dismisses as a mere technicality, however, is crucial to the analysis. The attorneys in Childs
did not accept the plaintiff's unsecured promise to transfer a portion of the plaintiffs
structured settlement payments as the plaintiff received them; few, if any, plaintiffs attor-
neys would agree to such an arrangement. The attorneys in Clilds structured the arrange-
ment so that their rights to ftiture payment were not subject to the default risk of the ser-
vice recipient (i.e., the plaintiff). Under well established common law economic benefit
principles, the elimination of such default risk causes the contractual payment obligations
to constitute property under I.R.C. § 83.
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and, accordingly, that it was not property.179 The attorneys therefore
were entitled to defer the recognition of income until they received
cash payments from the structured fee arrangement.180
The Tax Court decision in Childs, affirmed by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit without a published opinion, 81 is ob-
jectively flawed.182 There simply is no way of reconciling the result in
Childs with the decisions in Brodie and Drescher and the analysis in Reve-
nie Ruling 69-50.183 Like the executives in Brodie and Drescher and the
physicians in Revenue Ruling 69-50, the attorneys in Childs received
payment obligations from unrelated insurance companies as compen-
sation for their respective services.184 Yet Brodie, Drescher, and the phy-
sicians were taxed immediately, while the attorneys in Childs were not.
Because the Tax Court missed the third-party promise issue, it did not
attempt to reconcile its conclusion with these contrary authorities. De-
spite these obvious flaws, the Childs decision now serves as the founda-
tion of a burgeoning industry offering structured payments of attor-
ney's fees. 8 5
17 Childs, 103 T.C. at 649-53.
180 See id. at 653.
181 89 F.3d 856, 856 (11th Cir. 1996).
182 Sec Gordon T. Butler, Economic Benefit: Formulating a Workable Theory ofIncome Recogni-
tion, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 70, 115-17 (1996) (contending that the holding in Childs is
erroneous because the court failed to recognize that the payment obligation was issued by
a third party); Polsky & Hellwig, supra note 157, at 1131-35 (same). For revenue rulings
reaching a contrary holding in analogous factual circumstances, see Rev. Rul. 77-420, 1977-
2 C.B. 172 and Rev. Rul. 69-50, 1969-1 C.B. 140. Nonetheless, additional authority for the
Tax Court's flawed interpretation of I.R.C. § 83 in Childs does exist. See Minor v. United
States, 772 F.2d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that benefits issued by a third-party
did not constitute property because they were "unsecured"). For discussion and criticism
of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Minoi; see Polsky & Hellwig, supra note 157, at 1136-39.
18 SecDresche,; 179 F.2d at 865-66; Bwndie, 1 T.C. at 282-84; Rev. Rul. 69-50.
18 SSCs are affiliates of life insurance companies, but this distinction is of no doctrinal
or substantive import.
18 One commentator has suggested that the result in Childs is limited to attorney's fees
that stem from a plaintiff's claim that is described in I.R.C. § 104(a) (2):
While the decision in Childs broadened the class of payees covered under struc-
tured settlements to include attorneys, it leaves intact the requirement that the
periodic payments must result from a judgment or settlement where the pay-
ments to the claimant are on account of a personal physical injury or sickness
within the meaning of § 104(a) (2).
See Risk, supra note 148, at 661. The Tax Court, however, did not (nor could not) justify
the result in Childs with reference to I.R.C. § 104(a) (2), and there is no reason to believe
that the tax treatment of structured attorney's fees depends on the nature of the litigation
in which the fees were earned.
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As illustrated above, by deferring the recognition of income until
receipt of cash, the rule in Childs allows structuring attorneys to effec-
tively invest their fees on a tax-free basis.186 Thus, the structured attor-
ney fee industry essentially offers unlimited "super-IRs" to trial law-
yers. Structured fees are superior to IRAs because they allow trial
lawyers to invest tax-free without any of the limitations and restrictions
that apply to IRAs. 187 There are no dollar limits on the amount of fees
that can be invested in a structured fee arrangement and there is no
penalty for pre-retirement withdrawals. 18s These arrangements provide
all the tax benefits of IRAs without any of the restrictions or limitations,
and they are (as a practical matter) available only to the personal injury
plaintiff's bar.189
In summary, Childs was wrongly decided, and its practical implica-
tions are significant. Under Childs, trial lawyers can easily avoid tax on
capital income in a way that was certainly never contemplated by Con-
gress. The IRS should immediately repudiate the Childs holding, and
the Treasury should clarify that third-party promises (such as SSC obli-
gations) constitute property in the I.R.C. § 83 regulations. Alternatively,
Congress should enact legislation to close the loophole.190
186 Although it is possible that the investment yield on the fee could be taxed to the
payor in the context of nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements, for reasons
explained in Part VI below, this form of substitute taxation does not exist in the structured
settlement context. Infra notes 235-262 and accompanying text.
167 Sec supra note 4.
188 Amounts invested in structured settlements can be "withdrawn" before retirement
age either by providing for cash payments to be received before then or by selling the SSC
obligation for cash.
189 Structured fee arrangements also compare quite favorably to employer-provided
qualified plans. Both provide tax-free compounding. Structured fee arrangements, unlike
qualified plans, allow unlimited "contributions" and penalty-free early "withdrawals." In
addition, unlike qualified plans, structured fee arrangements may be created for the ex-
clusive benefit of highly compensated employees. One industry participant has described
the structured fee arrangement as "a personal discriminatory retirement plan." Sec Struc-
tured Settlement Services LLC, Structured Concept Being Reinvented, http://www.structured
settlements.org/more-info/structured-reinvented/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2010).
190 Attorneys could argue that structured fee arrangements allow them to "smooth"
their income over time and that this smoothing should be allowed. We address this argu-
ment in the context of non-physical structured settlements. See infra notes 229-231 and
accompanying text. We conclude that although income averaging may be defensible as a
general policy matter, this argument is not persuasive because (i) income averaging is gen-
erally not available outside of the structuring context and there is no compelling policy
reason why it ought to be allowed only in this narrow context, and (ii) structuring provides
the significant benefit of tax-free investment yield; therefore, it does not simply ameliorate
any bunching problem. In addition, very successful attorneys (who would be most likely to
structure large amounts of fees) will likely be in the top marginal tax bracket for the rest of
their lives; therefore, they would not suffer from any bunching problem.
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V. STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS OF NON-PHYSICAL INJURY DAMAGES
In Part III, we explained that, in cases where the I.R.C. § 104(a) (2)
exclusion applies, Congress has abrogated the common law third-party
promise rule to allow plaintiffs to obtain a tax-free yield in structured
settlements governed by I.R.C. § 130.191 At the time I.R.C. § 130 was
enacted, the I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) exclusion applied to all personal injury
claims. In 1996, however, Congress narrowed the I.R.C. § 104(a) (2)
exclusion to apply only to claims involving a personal physical injury.192
As a result, damages received on account of a non-physical injury now
are fully taxable.193 This amendment to I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) necessarily
restricted the scope of qualified assignments under I.R.C. § 130. Under
I.R.C. § 130, qualified assignments are assignments of obligations to
make periodic payments that are excluded from gross income under
I.R.C. § 104(a) (2).194 Accordingly, I.R.C. § 130 no longer applies to
structured settlements of non-physical injury claims, and it would
therefore appear that the third-party promise rule would cause the SSC
obligation (a clear third-party promise) to be treated as property under
the cash method.
Under this view, non-physical injury structured settlements would
be immediately taxable to the plaintiff. Structuring plaintiffs, therefore,
would be taxed as if they received a lump-sum recovery equal to the
present value of the SSC obligation and subsequently invested the lump
sum in -the annuity that serves as the finding asset. Although this analy-
sis seems straightforward, the IRS appears to have a different view
Attorneys could also argue that structured fee arrangements make it easier for them
to convince their clients to accept structured settlements and that subjecting structured
fee arrangements to immediate taxation would burden them with a liquidity problem. The
Childs approach avoids this liquidity problem, thus making it easier for attorneys to accept
structured fee arrangements, which in turn makes it easier for attorneys to persuade their
clients to accept structured settlements'that are in the clients' best interests. Although this
might be plausible in some cases, the fact remains that yield exemption is a significant tax
benefit that results from the Childs analysis. In addition, the Childs approach is available
even in cases where the plaintiff accepts a lump sum. The better approach to the problem
would be for the attorney to educate a skeptical client on the present value of the struc-
tured settlement so that the client would be willing to accept a favorable structured settle-
ment even if the attorney's fee is taken in a lump sum. Alternatively, the attorney could
accept part of the fee in a lump sum and part as a structured fee and use the partial lump
sum to pay the tax due in the year of settlement.
191 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
192 See Small Business Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat.
1755, 1838.
193 Sce I.R.C. § 104 (a) (2) (2006).
M9 See id. § 130(c).
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A. The Govern ment's Non-BindingEndorsement ofChilds v. Commissioner
In Private Letter Ruling 2008-36-019,195 the IRS addressed the tax
consequences of a plaintiffs structured settlement of a non-physical
tort claim against her employer.196 To settle the non-wage (e.g., emo-
tional distress) claims of the plaintiff, the employer promised to make
future periodic payments to the plaintiff.197 The employer, as is typical
in structured settlements, paid an SSC to assume its obligation to make
these payments. 98 The SSC then used the payment to purchase an an-
nuity as the funding asset.'99 Under the third-party promise rule, the
fair market value of the SSC obligation that the employer purchased for
the benefit of the plaintiff would be currently taxable.200 Nonetheless,
the ruling concluded that the plaintiff would recognize income only as
cash payments were received pursuant to the arrangement. The IRS
reasoned as follows:
Neither the execution of the. Assignment [of the em-
ployer's obligation to the SSC] nor the purchase of an annuity
contract by the [SSC] to fund its obligation to the [plaintiff]
shall be viewed as conferring a current economic benefit on
the [plaintiff]. After the execution of the . . . Assignment, the
[plaintiffJl will possess only a mere promise to be paid (al-
though the identity of the pronisor will have changed).20'
This analysis perpetuates the mistake made by the Tax Court in
Childs v. Comnissioner:202 By ignoring the context in which the SSC obli-
gation was issued, the ruling creates a seemingly irreconcilable conflict
with the long-standing authorities of Brodie, Dresche,; and Revenue Rul-
195 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-36-019 (Sept. 5, 2008).
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Sec id.
199 Sec id.
200 Because the damage claim did not relate to a personal physical injury, I.R.C. § 104(a) (2)
had no application to the facts of the ruling. Even though the plaintiff had been employed by
the defendant, I.R.C. § 83 likely does not apply to the structured settlement of the non-wage
portion of the claim, as it is difficult to characterize tort compensation that does not relate to
the plaintiffs wages as having been transferred "in connection with the performance of ser-
vices." I.R.C. § 83 (2006). The non-wage injury suffered by the plaintiff in the ruling may have
depended on her status as an employee, but the compensated claim by definition did not relate
to the provision of services.
201 I.R.S. Pri. Ltr. Rul. 2008-36-019 (emphasis added).
2o2 See 103 T.C. 634, 648-53 (1994) (ignoring the second-party versus third-party issue
in ruling that an SSC obligation was not property), affd, 89 F.3d 856 (11th Cir. 1996).
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ing 69-50.203 The payment obligation in the ruling was issued by the
SSC, a third party to both the litigation as well as the employment rela-
tionship that gave rise to the litigation. 204 Under the long-standing ai-
thorities, such a third-party promise constitutes property that is taxable
upon receipt. 205
Despite the obvious conflict between the ruling and the long-
standing authorities, the letter ruling never mentions Brodie, Dresche,; or
Revenue Ruling 69-50. The IRS was apparently led astray by the Childs
decision. Though the ruling does not explicitly cite the Childs decision
as authority for its conclusion, it does favorably mention and discuss
Childs in its recitation of relevant authorities. 206 The ruling's sloppy
analysis-particularly, its failure to address conflicting authorities-and
its conclusion are fully consistent with that decision. In one respect, the
ruling is even worse than the Childs decision. Although the Tax Court
in Childs apparently overlooked the second-party versus third-party
promise issue, the IRS in Private Letter Ruling 2008-36-019 explicitly
declared irrelevant the fact that the identity of the promisor had
changed when the employer assigned its liability to the SSC.207 Al-
though private letter rulings officially carry no precedential weight, 208
the ruling supplies unwarranted credence to the flawed holding of the
Childs case.
B. A Threat to Capital Income Taxation?
If the conclusion of Private Letter Ruling 2008-36-019 truly repre-
sents the position of the IRS in this area, any remaining uncertainty
surrounding the validity of the holding in Childs will have been elimi-
nated. As a result, the benefit of tax-free investment offered through
structured settlements could be expanded far beyond that which Con-
gress intended.209 Theoretically, it could be available to any taxpayer
203 Sec I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-36-019.
204 Sec id.
205 See United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1950); Brodie v.
Comm'r, 1 T.C. 275, 282-84 (1942); Rev. Rul. 69-50, 1969-1 C.B. 140.
206 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-36-019.
207 The ruling expressly notes that "the identity of the promisor" had changed from
the employer to the SSC. Id.
20s Rather, private letter rulings are binding only on the IRS with respect to the party
to whom it is issued. I.R.C. § 6110(k) (3) (2006).
209 In fact, the benefit of tax-free investing that is granted to non-physical injury plain-
tiffs and to attorneys under a Childs analysis is even more advantageous than that granted
to physical injury plaintiffs under I.R.C. § 104(a) (2). The latter plaintiffs cannot sell their
structured settlements for cash without triggering the excise tax in I.R.C. § 5891, absent a
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who wishes to invest any amount of gross income in any sort of annu-
ity.210 A taxpayer could "structure" their receipt of this gross income by
causing the payor to simply pay amounts to an SSC, which then prom-
ises to make deferred payments to the taxpayer. In fact, commentators
have already recognized that the Childs decision could be used in the
context of installment sales of property.211 Indeed, if Private Letter Rul-
ing 2008-36-019 and the Childs case on which it rests are taken to their
logical conclusion, then employees and other service providers could,
through the use of structures, easily avoid the limitations and restric-
tions of IRAs and qualified plans without sacrificing yield exemption.
C. Distinguishing the Rulingfiom Prior Authorities
Because the ruling's analysis is conclusory, it is difficult to surmise
the IRS's reasoning to support it. We believe, given the similarity of
their respective analyses and conclusions, that it is likely based on the
IRS's favorable opinion of the substantially flawed Childs decision. It is
possible, however, that the IRS has implicitly drawn a distinction be-
tween the cash method rules that apply in the compensation-for-
services context and those that apply in the context of tort litigation.
The economic benefit doctrine, which includes the third-party promise
rule, traditionally has been applied in the service context, where cash
method issues arise most frequently. The decisions in Brodie and Dre-
scher, as well as Revenue Ruling 69-50, all of which treated third-party
promises as property under the cash method, involved payment obliga-
tions issued as compensation for services.212 Private Letter Ruling 2008-
36-019, therefore, may signal the IRS's belief that the third-party prom-
ise rule does not apply in the tort recovery context.
court order finding that it is in the best interests of the selling plaintiff. In contrast, I.R.C.
§ 5891 does not apply to structured payment obligations owned by non-physical injury
plaintiffs and attorneys. Accordingly, they can sell their payment rights and never trigger
the excise tax. In other words, physical injury plaintiffs receive the benefit of yield exemp-
tion at the cost of some illiquidity, but non-physical injury plaintiffs and trial lawyers re-
ceive only the benefit ofyield exemption.
210 See Steven R. Craig & Blake M. Holler, The Use ofNonqualified Structured Settlements in
the Sale of Capital Assets, J. FIN. SERVICE PROF. 79, 82 (2006) (explaining that the economic
benefit doctrine "should not be an issue" because Childs addresses this doctrine as it "re-
lates to an assigned annuity contract").
211 See id. at 81-82 (describing how the structured settlement technique can be used
advantageously in the installment sale context).
212 SeeDresche; 179 F.2d at 865-66; Brodie, 1 T.C. at 282-84; Rev. Rul. 69-50, 1969-1 C.B.
140.
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Support for this view may be found by closely comparing Revenue
Ruling 69-50 with the 1979 rulings involving structured settlements of
personal injury claims.2 13 WAe have already explained that the relevant
facts in the rulings appear the same in all material respects, except that
the former involves compensation for services and the latter involve
tort recoveries. 214 Yet the rulings come to drastically different conch-
sions, suggesting that perhaps the cash method rules are different in
the tort context. In addition, the facts of the private letter ruling spe-
cifically note that the structured portion of the taxpayer's settlement
involved the non-wage portion of the settlement. 215 The wage portion
instead was paid through a lump-sum payment.216 This again suggests
that the IRS was possibly drawing a distinction in how the cash method
rules apply to tort recoveries vis-a-vis remuneration for services.
If the IRS in Private Letter Ruling 2008-36-019 implicitly drew a
distinction between payment obligations in the tort versus service con-
text, there are two notable consequences. First, the yield-exemption
loophole would be relatively narrow, as the tax benefit would be avail-
able only to tort plaintiffs. Second, it would mean that the analysis in
Childs remains flawed, as it involved the tax consequences of compensa-
tion for legal services (i.e., not a tort recovery).
We, however, do not believe that the IRS intended the private let-
ter ruling to signal its belief that the tax treatment of third-party pay-
ment obligations is context-dependent. Rather, because of the similarity
of their respective analyses and conclusions, we believe that the ruling
is based on the IRS's misguided adherence to the flawed decision in
Childs. It would be strange to cite and discuss Childs if the ruling's ra-
tionale were based on a theory that means that the case was improperly
decided. In addition, except when Congress has specifically legislated
to the contrary, the cash method rules are not context-specific nor have
they been applied by the IRS in a context-specific manner. For exam-
ple, lottery winnings were historically subject to the same cash method
doctrines established in the compensation-for-services context. Prob-
lems with this approach led Congress to adopt legislation modifying the
constructive receipt doctrine with respect to periodic payments of lot-
tery winnings. 217
213 Compare Rev. Rul. 79-313, 1979-2 C.B. 75, and Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74, With
Rev. Rul. 69-50.
211 See supra notes 128-135 and accompanying text.
215 Sec I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-36-019 (Sept. 5, 2008).
216 Sec id.
217 Sec I.R.C. § 461 (h) (2006).
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D. Possible Policy Justifications for the Ruling
Although the doctrinal foundation of Private Letter Ruling 2008-
36-019 is highly questionable, various policy arguments can be made to
support its result. This subpart suggests plausible policy justifications,
but ultimately finds them not fully persuasive.
1. Avoidance of AMT
One policy argument in favor of allowing non-physical injury plain-
tiffs to report gross income from structured settlements only as they re-
ceive cash is that it could allow certain plaintiffs to avoid the draconian
application of the Alternative Minimum Tax ("AMT"). A brief example
illustrates the AMT issue. Suppose a plaintiff successfidly prosecutes a
defamation suit with the assistance of counsel retained on a contingency
basis. The litigation results in a $3 million settlement, of which the at-
torney is entitled to $1 million. The $3 million dollar settlement is in-
cluded in the plaintiffs gross income because the claim is based on a
non-physical injury and, accordingly, the I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) exclusion
does not apply.218 Although the plaintiff may deduct the $1 million con-
tingent fee under I.R.C. § 212(1) as a cost of producing the $3 million
of gross income,219 the deduction suffers from its characterization as a
"miscellaneous itemized deduction [I" under I.R.C. § 67(b).220 As such,
the deduction is disallowed in its entirety for AMT purposes.221 The
2s8 See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).The full $3 million is included in the plaintiffs gross income
even though the plaintiff may never formally possess for a moment the $1 million attorney
fee portion of the award. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, for tax purposes, the
entire recovery, including the attorney fee portion, is included in the plaintiff's gross in-
come just as if the plaintiff had received the $1 million attorney fee portion and then paid
it over to the attorney in satisfaction of the plaintiff's contractual obligation to pay the
attorney. Sec Comm'r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 433-37 (2005) (including the contingent
attorney fee in the plaintiff's gross income through application of the assignment of in-
come doctrine); see also BrantJ. Hellwig, The Supreme Court's Casual Use of the Assignment of
Income Doctine, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 751, 765-95 (criticizing the analytical basis for the
decision but not its conclusion, and proposing an alternate rationale for the result).
219 See I.R.C. § 212(1). But see Charles Davenport, Why Tort Legal Fees Ar Not Deductible,
97 TAX NOTES 703, 703-05 (2002) (contending that the attorney fee should be recovered
as a transaction-cost offset to the recovery, leaving only the net recovery to be included in
gross income); Joseph M. Dodge, The Netting of Costs Against Income Receipts (Including Dam-
age Recoveries) Produced by Such Costs, Without Barring Congrss fom Disallowing Such Costs, 27
VA. TAX REv. 297, 334-347 (2007) (same). For a contrary view, see Brant J. Hellwig &
Gregg D. Polsky, Litigation Expenses and the Alternative Minimum Tax, 6 FLA. TAx REV. 899,
915-21 (2004).
220 I.R.C. § 67(b).
221 Sec id. § 56(b) (1) (A).
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plaintiff therefore will be forced to pay tax at AMT rates on the full $3
million settlement. The effect is an unjustifiably high tax rate on the $2
million of economic income received from the litigation.222
The result in Private Letter Ruling 2008-36-019 could be used by
plaintiffs to avoid harsh results under the AMT. By spreading the gross
income from the recovery over a number of years,'223 plaintiffs could
take advantage of the relatively large zero-rate bracket in the AMT to
circumvent the problem. 224 In this manner, Private Letter Ruling 2008-
36-019 would permit certain non-physical plaintiffs to exercise a meas-
ure of self-help against the AMT.225
The self-help justification, however, is at once overbroad and un-
derinclusive. It is overbroad because very few non-physical injury plain-
tiffs are subject to the AMT problem. Due to recent legislation, non-
physical injury plaintiffs whose claims arise out of employment-related
or civil rights litigation are entitled to deduct their legal fees "above-the-
line" in computing adjusted gross income, thereby avoiding the harsh
result under the AMT. 226 Thus, for example, the plaintiff in Private Let-
ter Ruling 2008-36-019 would not have been subject to the AMT prob-
lem because her discrimination claim was related to her employment.
Under current law, the AMT problem would potentially affect only
defamation and non-employment-related emotional distress claimants,
as well as all plaintiffs who recover punitive damages. 227 Yet the yield-
exemption benefit of Private Letter Ruling 2008-36-019 would be avail-
222 Given the spread between the plaintiffs tax base for the regular income tax (which
allows the deduction, but subjects it to the two percent floor of I.R.C. § 67(a) and the in-
come-based phase-out of I.R.C. § 68(a)) and the tax base for AMT purposes (which disal-
lows the deduction altogether), the plaintiff will owe more AMT liability than regular tax
liability.
22 In addition, presumably the deduction for the payment of attorney's fees would be
similarly spread out so as to properly match the expense to the income it generated.
224 The AMT exemption levels for 2009 are $46,700 for single taxpayers and $70,950
for married taxpayers filingjointly. SccI.R.C. § 55(d) (1) (West Supp. 2009).
2 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-36-019 (Sept. 5, 2008).
226 As part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Congress added what is today
I.R.C. § 62(a) (20) to permit the deduction for litigation expenses incurred in prosecuting
certain types of claims for non-physical injuries (primarily, claims of "unlawful discrimina-
tion" as defined in § I.R.C. 62(e)) to be taken in computing adjusted gross income-thereby
avoiding the various limitations on itemized deductions. See Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118
Stat. 1418, 1546-47. The legislation, however, failed to reach all types of non-physical injury
claims. See Hellwig & Polsky, supra note 219, at 940-44 (describing the legislation and high-
lighting its shortcomings).
227 See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) (2006) (expressly excluding punitive damages from the scope
of the gross income exclusion); id. § 62(a)(20) (permitting deduction for litigation ex-
penses incurred in action "involving a claim of unlawful discrimination").
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able to all non-physical injury plaintiffs, a much larger class than those
affected by the AMT problem. Therefore, although the ruling's ap-
proach could help mitigate the AMT problem for an extremely small
class of non-physical injury plaintiffs, the ruling will provide the oppor-
tunity for tax-free investing to all non-physical injury plaintiffs. At the
same time, the self-help justification is underinclusive because only
those plaintiffs who are in the economic position to spread their cash
flows over time can avail themselves of the AMT relief. A plaintiff who
needs to consume the entire after-tax recovery in the current year will
have no opportunity to exercise this form of self-help. Likewise, the self-
help technique will be available only to plaintiffs whose advisors are
sophisticated enough to recognize the AMT problem in advance and
understand the opportunity to avoid it through structured settlements.
The better way to deal with the AIT problem is simply for Con-
gress to fix it directly. Litigation costs incurred in connection with a tax-
able recovery ought to be deductible in full under the AMT.22 8 Amend-
ing the Code to provide for such a result would solve the AMT problem
comprehensively without creating any additional loopholes. It would
also leave the traditional cash method principles intact. Altering founda-
tional doctrine to mitigate idiosyncratic legislative defects is risky be-
cause it may result in unintended and unanticipated collateral effects.
2. Income Smoothing
Another arguably beneficial policy result from the approach in
Private Letter Ruling 2008-36-019 is that it could allow a non-physical
injury plaintiff to avoid bunching an unusually large amount of income
into a single tax year. This bunching could subject a litigation recovery
to a higher tax rate than the plaintiff's normal marginal tax rate.229 The
ruling allows the plaintiff to spread a recovery over a number of years,
resulting in an income-smoothing effect. Thus, the ruling's approach
can be defended on the basis that it allows non-physical injury plaintiffs
an option to average their income.
228 See I.R.C. § 56(b) (1) (A) (presently disallowing the deduction of any "miscelleneous
itemized deduction").
229 Sc Gregg D. Polsky & Stephen F. Befort, Employmcnt Discimnination Remedies and Tax
Gross Ups, 90 IowA L. Rzv. 67, 74-78 (2004) (describing the potential bunching of income
caused by employment discrimination recoveries).
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This justification is not fully persuasive, as the bunching problem
applies to a whole host of taxpayers.230 Congress has experimented with
broad-based income averaging rules in the past to alleviate the problem,
but currently no such relief is available. 23' It is difficult to justify an ap-
proach that deviates from settled foundational doctrine in order to al-
low a very small subset of taxpayers an option that all other taxpayers do
not have. Furthermore, although the approach could ameliorate the
bunching problem for some non-physical injury plaintiffs, it would si-
multaneously provide all non-physical injury plaintiffs with the benefit
of tax-free investing. As with the AMT problem, if the bunching concern
is a problem that should be fixed, Congress should fix it directly and
comprehensively without creating new loopholes in unrelated areas.
3. Eliminating the Distinction Between Physical and Non-Physical
Damages
Finally, the approach in Private Letter Ruling 2008-36-019 can be
defended in terms of horizontal equity. Tort plaintiffs receiving dam-
ages for physical injuries arguably should not enjoy a comparative tax
advantage over tort plaintiffs receiving damages for non-physical
harms. Because the former can enjoy the benefit of tax-free investing of
their recoveries, the latter ought to as well, the argument goes. Al-
though this may be persuasive as a normative argument,232 it ignores
the fact that Congress has explicitly decided to treat these two types of
plaintiffs quite distinctly. Congress amended I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) in 1996
by inserting the "physical" modifier to the description of personal in-
jury damages that are subject to exclusion from gross income.233 Con-
230 Sec generally Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40
HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 395 (2003) (detailing the adverse effects of annual income reporting
on low-income taxpayers).
231 See I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305 (1982), rcpealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, § 141, 100 Stat. 2085, 2117.
232 See, e.g., Karen B. Brown, Not Color- or GenderNeutral: New Tax Treatment of Employment
Discrimination Damages, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 223, 249-67 (1998); J. Martin
Burke & Michael K. Friel, Getting Physical: Excluding Personal Injty Awards Under the New
Section 104(a)(2), 58 MONT. L. REV. 167, 178-93 (1997); F. Patrick Hubbard, Making People
Whole Again: The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Tort Damages for Mental Distress, 49
FLA. L. REV. 725, 753-66 (1997); Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, Discrimination Against
Damages for Unlawful Discrimination: The Supreme Court, Congress, and the Income Tax, 35
HARV.J. ON LEGis. 447, 499-505 (1998); MarkJ. Wolff, Scx, Race, andAge:DoubleDiscimina-
tion in Torts and Taxes, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1439-82 (2000).
233 See Small Businessjob Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat.
1755, 1838.
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gress created this explicit (and almost certainly misguided) 234 distinc-
tion, and it is Congress's job to remove it.
VI. TAX CONSEQUENCES TO OTHER PARTIES
Part I.B.2, explained that the effect of deferring the taxation of
structured settlements is to exempt from taxation the investment re-
turn that is imbedded within the arrangement.23 5 As part of that discus-
sion, we noted that this conclusion assumed that a tax burden was not
imposed on some other party to the structured settlement that would
offset this benefit.236 If such a burden were in fact imposed, it would
have to be compared to the tax benefit received by the payee23 7 to de-
termine whether an overall tax benefit results from such structures. In
other words, to determine the tax consequences from a structuring
transaction, the tax consequences to all parties to the transaction must
be considered. This Part undertakes the remaining task of evaluating
the tax consequences of structured settlements to parties other than
the plaintiff or the attorney. It concludes that these other parties do not
incur a substitute tax that offsets (partially or wholly) the tax benefit
received by plaintiffs or attorneys by structuring their respective litiga-
tion recoveries. 23 8
A. Consequences to the Defendant
When a self-insured defendant structures a settlement, it first prom-
ises to make certain future payments to the plaintiff. Shortly thereafter,
it makes a lump sum payment to the SSC in consideration for the SSC's
assumption of the defendant's obligations to make these periodic pay-
ments. Upon the effective assignment of the payment obligation to the
2 Perhaps the most plausible policy argument in favor of the distinction is based on
administrative concerns. If one assumes that non-physical injury damages (e.g., employment
discrimination damages) are more likely than physical injury damages (e.g., automobile ac-
cident damages) to result in a larger lost wages component, and if allocating damages be-
tween wage and non-wage components proves difficult in practice, the distinction may be
acceptable as a rough justice solution.
235 Sce supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
236 Scesupra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
2 Although the plaintiff nominally receives the tax benefit of yield exemption, all or a
portion of the benefit could be captured by the other parties to the arrangement. For
example, the settlement cost to the defendant could be lower than it otherwise would be if
the tax benefit was not available to the plaintiff. For discussion of this point, see supra
notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
23 As explained below, however, this conclusion is not entirely free from doubt.
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SSC, the defendant's obligation to make any future payments with re-
spect to the plaintiff is extinguished. 239
Leaving aside tax consequences for a moment, the defendant is in
the same economic position whether or not a settlement is structured.
In a lump-sum settlement, the defendant pays a lump-sum amount to
the plaintiff in exchange for the release of the plaintiffs claim. In a
structured settlement, the defendant obtains the release of the plain-
tiff's claim by paying a lump-sum amount to the SSC. From the defen-
dant's perspective, the only difference between the two arrangements is
the name of the payee on the lump-sum check, which is trivial. The
critical tax issue is whether the defendant's indifference between lump-
sum and structured settlements remains after tax consequences are in-
troduced.
In a lump-sum settlement, the defendant will receive a deduction
equal to the amount of the lump-sum payment at the time of payment.
For example, a defendant that pays a lump sum of $10,000 to settle a
claim incurred in connection with the defendant's business will receive
a $10,000 deduction at the time of the lump-sum payment. What if the
defendant enters into a structured settlement and instead pays $10,000
to an SSC, which promises to pay the plaintiff $11,000 in one year?
In the context of structured settlements of claims involving a per-
sonal physical injury, the defendant would receive a $10,000 deduction
at the time it makes the payment to the SSC because the structured set-
tlement falls within the scope of I.R.C. § 130.240 Thus, the timing and
amount of the deduction are the same, and the defendant therefore
suffers no adverse tax consequences when it structures a settlement in
lieu of paying a lump sum.
In cases involving non-physical injuries, however, a defendant's tax
consequences are less certain.241 Under Treas. Reg. § 1.46 1-4(g) (1), a
239 The plaintiff, in technical terms, grants the defendant (insurer) a novation with re-
spect to its obligation to make future payments. Sec supro note 10.
2o See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-6(a) (1992) (providing that economic performance occurs
when a defendant makes a qualified assignment under I.R.C. § 130). This regulation con-
firms the result reached by the Tax Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Commissioner. Sec 102 T.C. 87,
94 (1994) (analyzing the tax consequences to defendants who entered into structured
settlements of personal injury claims in 1970).
24 Structured settlements in these cases do not involve qualified assignments and are
therefore not covered by I.R.C. § 130. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2) (2006) (excluding only payments
received on account of physical injuries); id. § 130(c) (1) (defining qualified assignment as
one involving periodic payments that are excludible under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)). Because
I.R.C. § 130 does not govern the assignment, the special economic performance rule de-
scribed supra note 240 is inapplicable. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-6 (a) (applying only to qualified
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tort defendant must make a "payment . . . to the person to which the
liability is owed" in order to claim a deduction. 242 This language sug-
gests that payment must be made to the plaintiff before any deduction
can be taken. Such an interpretation appears consistent with the regu-
lation's preamble, which explicitly rejected the suggestion of prior
commentators that an immediate deduction should be allowed "if the
taxpayer pays a third party to assume the liability and the third party
becomes primarily liable to satisfy the taxpayer's liability."243 Under
such an interpretation, a self-insured defendant's deduction would be
delayed until the plaintiff actually received cash payments from the
SSC. In addition, the amount of the deduction would be limited to the
amount that the self-insured defendant paid the SSC to assume the de-
fendant's liability to make future payments to the plaintiff.244 In the
hypothetical above, the defendant therefore would receive a deduction
of $10,000 (i.e., the amount that it paid to the SSC) one year later,
when the plaintiff receives the $11,000 payment from the SSC. Because
the $10,000 deduction is delayed, the defendant is taxed more harshly
than it would have been taxed had it paid a lump-sum amount to the
plaintiff. This extra burden would serve as a proxy tax on the defen-
dant that, under certain conditions, would precisely offset the tax bene-
fit to the plaintiff.245
assignments). Instead, the general economic performance rules found in Treas. Reg. 1.461-4
apply in the non-physical injury structured settlement context.
242 Treas. Reg. § 1.6 1-4(g) (1) (as amended in 2004).
243 TD. 8408, 1992-1 C.B. 155.
244 Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(1)(i) (providing that the amount of the deduction that is
allowed when "payment is made from [another] person or fund to the person to which the
liability is owed may not exceed the amount the taxpayer transferred to the other person
or fund").
2 The amount of the burden placed on the defendant would depend on the defen-
dant's marginal tax rate. If, in the hypothetical involving the $11,000 delayed payment to
the plaintiff, the defendant's marginal tax is 40% and the discount rate is 10% (as the facts
in the example imply because that is the rate of return imbedded within the structured
settlement itself), the defendant is effectively forced to make an interest-free one-year loan
of $4000 to the government. The foregone after-tax interest on this loan is $240 ($4000 x
10% x 60%). That is the additional tax cost to the defendant of entering into the struc-
tured settlement, and it perfectly offsets the tax benefit to a plaintiff that is subject to the
same marginal tax rate. Instead of receiving an immediate $6000 ($10,000 x 60%) after
taxes from the lump sum settlement, the plaintiff receives $6600 ($11,000 x 60%) after
taxes at the end of the year. A plaintiff who invests the after-tax amount from the lump
sum settlement for a year receives $6360 ($6000 + 6% x $6000) after taxes at the end of
the year. The plaintiff is $240 richer as a result of structuring at the end of one year. More
generally, when the plaintiff and the defendant are subject to the same constant marginal
tax rate, the benefit to the plaintiff from structuring will be precisely offset by the burden
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In recent guidance, however, the IRS appears to have retreated
from the interpretation implied by the preamble in cases where a tax-
payer/assignor has received a novation of liability in connection with a
third-party assignment. In Notice 2003-77, the IRS cited Maxus Ene'g
Coip. & Subsidiaries v. United States for the proposition that a "taxpayer's
payment to a settlement fund effectively constitute [s] payment to the
person to which the liability [is] owed [if] the claimants agree [] to look
solely to the fund to satisfy their claims and, therefore, the taxpayer's
payment to the fund discharge [s] its liability to the claimant."246 Under
this view, a payment by a defendant to an SSC would be treated as a
payment "to the person to which the liability is owed" under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.4 6 1-4 (g) (1) if the payment to the SSC extinguishes the defendant's
liability to the plaintiff.247 Because structured settlements typically do
involve such a novation, a defendant would be able to claim an imme-
diate deduction upon making the lump-sum payment to the SSC, just
as if the defendant had instead paid that lump-sum amount directly to
the plaintiff. Accordingly, under the Maxus Enery view, no proxy tax
would be imposed on defendants. 248
Before the issuance of Notice 2003-77, it was unclear whether the
IRS viewed the quoted language from Maxus Eneg'y as having any con-
tinuing relevance, as the case was decided based on facts that predated
the effective date of Treas. Reg. § 1.46 1-4 (g) (1). Accordingly, the court
could not consider the regulation or its preamble in its analysis; in-
stead, the court had to rely on the underlying statutory language, which
is ambiguous on this issue.249 The promulgation of the regulation
therefore could be interpreted as rendering the quoted language of
Maxus Eney obsolete. Yet Notice 2003-77 reveals that the IRS, at least
for now, has concluded otherwise.250
on the defendant of structuring tinder the interpretation of Treas. Reg. § 1.461- 4 (g) (1)
implied by the preamble.
246 See I.R.S. Notice 2003-77, 2003-2 C.B. 1182, 1183 (citing Maxus Energy Corp. &
Subsidiaries v. United States, 31 F.3d 1135, 1144-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
247 Treas. Reg. § 1.4 6 1-4 (g) (1) (i).
28 See Maxus Encgy, 31 F.3d at 1144-45.
24 See id. at 1143-44.
250 This conclusion may be justifiable because it is possible to interpret the preamble
in a manner consistent with Maxus Eneigy. The language of the preamble describes an
assignee of a tort liability that becomes "primarily liable" to the tort claimant, suggesting
that the drafters of the regulation were assuming that the defendant would remain secon-
darily liable. See T.D. 8408, 1992-1 C.B. 155. In Maxus Encip and in the typical structure,
the defendant is completely released from any future liability to the plaintiff once it makes
the requisite payment to the SSC. The IRS's view that Maxus Encrgy has continuing rele-
vance following the issuance of Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g) (1) could be based on this distinc-
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Despite the somewhat ambiguous law on the issue, SSCs believe
that self-insured defendants can, consistent with language in Notice
2003-77, take an immediate deduction in non-physical injury structured
settlements. For instance, the form document of the assignment of li-
ability used by one prominent SSC includes the following language:
Assignor [i.e., the defendant in cases where the defendant is
self-insured] is hereby completely and irrevocably released
and discharged from any liability to Claimant with respect to
the Periodic Payment Claim. The sole liability of the Assignor
with respect to the Periodic Payment Claim shall be a liability
owed to the [SSC], so that the [SSC] is hereby the sole person
to whom the liability is owed with respect to the Periodic Pay-
ment Claim, within the meaning of U.S. Treasury Regulation
§ 1.46 1-4(g) (1) (ii).251
Unless the IRS changes its position with respect to the continuing
relevance of Maxus Eneig and thereafter successfully persuades a re-
viewing court, a self-insured defendant in a non-physical injury suit will
be taxed the same whether it pays a lump sum or enters into a struc-
tured settlement. 252 Accordingly, no proxy tax would be imposed on
defendants who enter into structured settlements. 253
In summary, it is clear that no proxy tax on structured settlements
will be imposed on self-insured tort defendants in physical injury suits or
on defendants who are insured.254 With respect to self-insured defen-
dants in non-physical injury suits, the current view of the IRS as ex-
tion. Nevertheless, if the purpose of the "payment . .. to the person to which the liability is
owed" rule is to impose a proxy tax on the payor of periodic payments, then it should
make no difference whether the defendant's future liability to the plaintiff is completely
eliminated or merely subordinated to the SSC's liability. Id.
251 Allstate International Assignments Ltd., Form of Nonqualified Assignment and Re-
lease, http://aiassign.com/forms/9-08/NQNQARIA.doc. (last visited Jan. 19, 2010).
252 See I.R.S. Notice 2003-77, 2003-2 C.B. 1182.
253 Scc id. Note that the discussion thus far has focused on defendants that are self-
insured and that, accordingly, make the lump sum payment to the SSC themselves. If the
defendant is insured against liability for the claim, analyzing the defendant's tax conse-
quences is far simpler. Regardless of how the insurance company decides to defend the
case or settle the matter, the defendant's tax consequences are unaffected. From a tax
perspective, an insured defendant is an uninvolved bystander.
254 Although the typical structured settlement involves an assignment of liability to an
SSC, it is theoretically possible that a self-insured defendant would retain the obligation to
make future payments to the plaintiff. In such a case, Treas. Reg. § 1.4 6 1-4(g)(1) would
delay and limit the defendant's deduction in the manner described above. Accordingly,
assuming the defendant is subject to U.S. federal income tax, there would be a proxy tax
imposed on the defendant.
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pressed in Notice 2003-77 suggests that no proxy tax would be imposed
on defendants in this context.
B. Consequences to Defendant's Insurer
Under the rules governing the taxation of liability insurers, the
defendant's insurer is taxed the same whether it pays a lump-sum
amount to the plaintiff or pays the amount to an SSC in a structured
settlement.255 Accordingly, there is no proxy tax imposed on the de-
fendant's insurer when cases are resolved through a structured settle-
ment.
C. Consequences to the SSC
The typical structured settlement involves an assignment of the
liability from the defendant or its insurer to an SSC. From the SSC's
perspective, two different tax issues arise.256 First, does an SSC recog-
nize income when it receives the lump sum payment from the defen-
dant (insurer) in consideration for the SSC's promise to make future
payments to the plaintiff? Second, how is the SSC taxed when it re-
ceives periodic payments from the annuity that serves as the funding
asset and then retransfers those payments over to the plaintiff?
Theoretically, the SSC should not realize any net income tax con-
sequences from its role in the structured settlement arrangement apart
from any transaction fee it may extract. The SSC serves as a mere in-
termediary, using funds received from the defendant to purchase an
annuity and then forwarding the resulting periodic payments to the
plaintiff.
1. Consequences to an SSC Receiving Qualified Assignment
In the context of structured settlements involving physical injury
plaintiffs, the theoretically correct result has been codified in I.R.C.
§ 130.257 I.R.C. § 130(a) provides an exclusion from the gross income
255 Sce I.R.C. §§ 831-832 (2006).
256 The SSC typically receives a $250 to $750 fee for its role in the structured settle-
ment. Although this fee is taxed, the tax is not properly considered a proxy tax on struc-
tured settlements, as it simply represents a proper tax on compensation income. For the
sake of simplicity, the discussion above assumes that the SSC does not get paid for its role,
although the conclusion that there is no proxy tax would be the same if such a payment
were received.
257 I.R.C. § 130 excludes from an SSC's gross income the payment it receives from the
defendant (or its insurer) to the extent the SSC uses the payment to purchase the funding
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of the SSC for amounts it receives under a qualified assignment, to the
extent such amounts are applied toward the purchase of a qualified
funding asset. I.R.C. § 130(b) assigns a zero basis in the qualified fund-
ing asset, meaning that periodic payments received by the SSC (includ-
ing investment yield) are included in gross income. Because the SSC is
obligated to immediately transfer these amounts to the plaintiff, how-
ever, the SSC receives an offsetting deduction. 258 As a result, the SSC
generally realizes no tax consequences from a structured settlement
transaction.
2. Consequences to an SSC Receiving Nonqualified Assignment
Because I.R.C. § 130(a) by its terms applies only to assignments
involving physical injury plaintiffs, the negative implication of this provi-
sion is that assignments in other types of structured settlements subject
the SSC to taxation.259 If that is the case, the SSC would recognize fee
income upon receipt of payment for the qualified assumption. In turn,
the SSC would be entitled to deduct the same nominal amount in later
years when it makes payments to the plaintiff. The mismatching of tim-
ing of the income inclusion and subsequent deduction for the same
nominal amounts would impose a tax burden on the SSC.
In addition to the mismatching of the income and deduction at-
tributable to the principal component of the annuity, the perfect net-
ting of income and deduction attributable to the investment income
generated by the annuity would not occur in the context of structured
settlements outside the I.R.C. § 130 context. I.R.C. § 72(u) accelerates
the taxation of income from annuities owned by corporations and
other non-natural persons. Although this rule is expressly inapplicable
to annuities held as funding assets in structured settlements of physical
injury damages, there exists no such carv:e-out for other structures. 260
As a result, income from an annuity could be realized by an SSC before
the SSC receives the corresponding payment from the annuity. Since
asset. As stated supra note 256, the SSC usually receives a small premium for its role and,
under I.R.C. § 130, this premium, which represents a fee for services, is properly taxed.
25 See Tax Treatument of Structured Settlements: Heaing Before the Subcomun. on Oversight of the
H. Conmn. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 9 (1999) (statement ofJoseph Mikrut, Tax Leg-
islative Counsel, U.S. Department of the Treasury) ("The payments to the structured set-
tlement company are not subject to tax to the extent they are netted out as payment to the
injured person.").
25 See I.R.C. § 130 (limiting the scope of a qualified assignment to cases "involving
physical injury or physical sickness").
2 See id. § 72(u) (3) (C).
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the offsetting deduction for the SSC's payment to a plaintiff may be
claimed only when the payment is re-transferred to the plaintiff, an ad-
ditional tax burden would be placed on the SSC. The combined tax
burdens attributable to the mismatching of income and deductions
would have to be compared to the yield exemption benefit to see if
structured settlements involving non-physical injuries would remain
tax-advantaged on the whole.
To avoid these tax burdens, SSCs involved in structured settle-
ments of non-physical injuries are typically domiciled in Barbados. 26'
Based on the U.S. tax treaty with Barbados, there is no U.S. taxation of
the SSC on the lump sum payment that it receives from the defendant
or its insurer nor upon the accelerated investment income the SSC re-
alizes by operation of I.R.C. § 72(u). 262
3. Summary
With respect to structured settlements involving physical injury
plaintiffs, statutory rules make clear that there is no proxy tax imposed
on SSCs. Although SSCs participating in structured settlements in other
contexts potentially face an extra tax burden, SSCs that participate in
these arrangements are domiciled in Barbados precisely to avoid the
prospect of any adverse tax consequences. Based on the U.S.-Barbados
treaty, these SSCs will pay no U.S. income tax in connection with their
participation in structuring transactions. Accordingly, they too will not
be subject to any proxy tax.
CONCLUSION
In I.R.C. § 104(a) (2), Congress has provided a subsidy to physical
injury plaintiffs that allows them to invest their litigation recoveries on
a tax-free basis through structured settlements. Trial lawyers now claim
that the same benefit applies to them under general principles of tax
law. They base this conclusion exclusively on the Tax Court's decision
in Childs v. Commissioner. Since the decision in Childs, a burgeoning in-
dustry of "nonqualified structured settlements" has emerged to exploit
the yield exemption that results from its conclusions. A recent private
letter ruling implies that the IRS respects the Childs decision.
261 Sc Craig & Holler, supra note 210, at 80 (noting that "two life insurance companies ac-
tive in the structured settlement business" devised the "solution" of domiciling "the assign-
ment company offshore to avoid the tax problems of onshore corporate annuity ownership").
262 Scc United States-Barbados Income and Capital Tax Convention, U.S.-Barb., Dec.
31, 1984, 1991-2 C.B. 436.
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We have argued that Childs is a fantastically flawed decision. The
decision ignored critical precedents that were directly on point and
were inconsistent with Childs reasoning and conclusion. Despite the
flaws of the Childs decisions, trial lawyers may argue that the result is
justifiable because corporate executives often receive large amounts of
nonqualified deferred compensation. The analogy between structured
fee arrangements and nonqualified deferred compensation, however, is
false. In a nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement, the em-
ployer is taxed on the executive's investment yield during the period of
deferral. As illustrated in this Article, however, no party pays tax on the
attorney's investment yield in a structured fee arrangement.263 This
absence of substitute taxation ensures that structured attorney's fees
provide a significant tax advantage to the structuring attorney at the
expense of the public fisc.
Plaintiffs who receive structured settlements of non-physical injury
claims similarly rely on Childs to claim the tax benefit of yield exemp-
tion. Although non-physical injury plaintiffs can make several plausible
policy arguments to support this treatment in this narrow context, we
have addressed those arguments and ultimately have found them un-
persuasive.
To close the unintended yield-exemption loophole, the IRS should
publicly repudiate the holding in Childs. The IRS could do so by adopt-
ing audit and litigating positions to this effect, and by implementing a
unified ruling posture on the issue. Such a firm stand would likely lead
to a judicial re-examination of whether the issuance of the SSC obliga-
tion is currently taxable to the beneficiary outside of the physical injury
context and, hopefully, a more thoughtful resolution of the issue by
courts.
Relying on judicial re-examination, of course, takes time and in-
volves some risk that courts will not perform any better. Therefore, we
recommend that Treasury or Congress close the yield-exemption loop-
hole. Treasury could, through regulation, clarify that receipt of a third-
party promise constitutes a payment under the cash method of ac-
counting. Furthermore, in the context of compensation for services,
Treasury could amend the regulatory definition of property under
I.R.C. § 83 to explicitly include third-party promises. Such regulatory
action would fall well within the scope of Treasury's authority to inter-
263 In addition, in a nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement, the employee
must remain subject to his employer's insolvency risk to obtain deferral. In a structured fee
arrangement, the attorney gets to choose the counterparty SSC that the attorney desires
and still (under Childs) obtain deferral.
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pret the Internal Revenue Code. Alternatively, Congress could enact
statutory amendments that clarify the issue.
Unless these three actors-the IRS, Treasury, and Congress-are
content with having unintended and unlimited tax-free investment ve-
hicles that are available for a small subset of taxpayers, they should act
to close the loophole. Otherwise, the structured settlement industry
will only continue to expand, undermining the taxation of capital in-
come in the process.
APPENDIX
Part II.B. of the Article explained that if the structured settle-
ment company's obligation (the "SSC obligation") to the plaintiff
were disregarded as an item of property for cash method purposes,
such that the plaintiff was taxed only as cash payments were received,
the effect would be to allow the plaintiff to invest the recovery on a
tax-free basis. The same yield-exemption effect would apply where
attorneys structure their fees, assuming again that the SSC obligation
is disregarded. The pixrpose of this Appendix is to provide a specific
numerical example that illustrates this yield-exemption effect.
Consider the following hypothetical: On January 1 of Year 1,
Plaintiff, who suffered a non-physical injury, settles with Insurance
Company ("IC") for $1,000,000. Plaintiff decides not to receive the
entire after-tax264 amount immediately. Instead, one-third will be re-
ceived today, another third in one year, and the final third in two
years. Deferred amounts will earn interest at the rate of 7%. Plaintiffs
marginal tax rate is 35%.
Plaintiff now has two options. The first is to receive a $1,000,000
lump sum award and invest a portion of the after-tax proceeds
($650,000) in an annuity that would make future payments in a man-
ner consistent with the desired payout. Alternatively, Plaintiff could
enter into a structured settlement.
If Plaintiff chooses the lump sum option, tax in the amount of
$350,000 must immediately be paid, leaving after-tax funds of
$650,000. To create three equal payments, $418,520 would be invested
in an annuity, which would provide two annual payments of $231,480,
one on January 1, Year 2 and the other on January 1, Year 3. After in-
vesting the $418,520 in the annuity, Plaintiff is left with $231,480 on
January 1, Year 1. Plaintiff will therefore receive three equal annual
2 Recall that non-physical injury damages are taxable. Cf. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006)
(excluding damages that result from personal physical injuries).
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payments of $231,480. The results to Plaintiff are shown below in Ta-
ble 1.
Table 1: Lump Sum
Ian. 1, Year 1 lan. 1, Year 2 jan. 1, Year 3 FVon 1/1/3
Payment received $1,000,000 $231,480 $231,480
Tax on payment ($350,000) ($7778) ($7778)
Amount of payment $650,000 $223,702 $223,702
after-tax
Purchase price of annuity ($418,520) N/A N/A
ount leftafter taxes $231,480 $223,702 $223,702
and annuity purchase
Future valie of after-tax
amount on Jan. 1, Year 3
taking into account $253,024 $233,880 $223,702 $710,606
Plaintiffs after-tax invest-
ment rate of 4.55%
As the Table 1 shows, on January 1 of Year 3 Plaintiff will have
$710,606 from the settlement, assuming all of the after-tax proceeds
from the initial payment and the two annuity payments are invested at
an after-tax rate of return of 4.55% (7% x (1-.35)).
If Plaintiff instead opts for a structured settlement, IC would pay
$356,123 and use the remaining $643,877 to purchase the SSC obliga-
tion, which requires the SSC to make the two future payments of
$356,123 to Plaintiff. If the SSC obligation were disregarded, Plaintiff
would be taxed only as each of the three $356,123 payments were re-
ceived. The consequences of this are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Structured Settlement
_Jan. 1, Year 1 Jan. 1, Year 2 Jan. 1, Year 3 FV on 1/1/3
Payment received $356,123 $356,123 $356,123
Tax on payment ($124,643) ($124,643) ($124,643)
Amount of payment after- $231,480 $231,480 $231,480tax
Future value of after-tax
amount on Jan. 1, Year 3
taking into account TP's $253,024 $242,012 $231,480 $726,516
after-tax investment rate
of 4.55%
This shows that Plaintiff is better off under this scenario than un-
der the lump sum. Instead of having $710,608 on January 1 of Year 3,
Plaintiff has $726,516, a difference of $15,910. The $15,910 amount
represents the two tax payments of $7778 on the annuity yield in Year
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2 and Year 3 in Table 1, after an appropriate adjustment to the Year 2
payment to reflect Plaintiff's 4.55% after-tax investment yield. 265 In
effect, therefore, Plaintiff in the Table 2 scenario has avoided tax on
the investment yield of the portion of the $1,000,000 recovery (i.e.,
$643,877) that she invested with the SSC.
To see this yield-exemption effect more clearly, consider what
would happen if Plaintiff received a lump sum of $1,000,000 and then
was allowed to invest the after-tax recovery in a tax-exempt annuity.
Plaintiff would owe immediate tax of $350,000, leaving a remainder of
$650,000. To equalize the payments, Plaintiff would buy an annuity
for $418,520, which would make two annual payments of $231,480.
The annuity purchase would leave Plaintiff with $231,480 ($1,000,000
less $350,000 tax less $418,520 annuity purchase price) on January 1,
Year 1. Thus, Plaintiff will receive three equal payments of $231,480.
Plaintiffs results are shown below in Table 3.
Table 3: Immediate Payment, Followed by Investment in Tax-Exempt Annuity
Jan. 1, Year 1 Jan. 1, Year 2 Jan. 1, Year 3 FV on 1/1/3
Payment received $1,000,000 $231,480 $231,480
Tax on payment ($350,000) ($0) ($0)
Amount of payment $650,000 $231,480 $231,480
ter-tax
Purchase price of annuity ($418,520) N/A N/A
Amount left after taxes $231,480 $231,480 $231,480
and annuity purchase
Future value of after-tax
amount on Jan 1, Year 3
taking into account TP's $253,024 $242,012 $231,480 $726,516
after-tax investment rate
of4.55%
Plaintiff is left with $726,516, the same amount as in Table 2,
where the SSC obligation was disregarded, which allowed Plaintiff to
report income only as cash payments were received. Table 3, there-
fore, shows that disregarding the SSC obligation has the same eco-
nomic effect as yield exemption.
265 ($7,778 x 1.0455) + $7,778 = $15,910.
